A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY 

China-US Relations in the Eyes of the Chinese Communist Party 

AN INSIDER’S PERSPECTIVE CAI XIA CGSP Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • June 2021 

How does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) view the China-US relationship, and what factors have shaped China’s approach to the United States? 

As a former insider in the CCP and professor at the Central Party School for many years, I would like to offer here some personal reflections on these questions (even though I am not an expert on Sino-American relations). 

Looking back on China-US relations over the past half century, we Chinese should first affirm and thank the US government for its “engagement policy” with China, which helped China end thirty years of isolation and poverty. China’s rapid economic and social development and tremendous changes are inseparable from the sincere exchanges and help of the US government as well as people in American scientific, technological, educational, cultural, and economic circles. 

This assistance provided an extremely precious historical opportunity and development space for China to integrate into international society, get in touch with and understand modern civilization, and restore economic and social vitality. As a result, many Chinese have had the opportunity to get out of the country and thus change their destiny and that of their families. 

Currently there are more than five million Chinese who have emigrated to the US. The vast majority of them came after the 1980s through study, work, or immigration, becoming permanent residents with green cards or naturalized American citizens. In turn, their close interactions with their relatives, friends, and colleagues back in China have helped to broaden the Chinese people’s views and opened their minds. 

However, looking at it objectively, the Chinese Communist Party’s fundamental interests and its basic mentality of using the US while remaining hostile to it have not changed over the past seventy years.

 By contrast, since the 1970s, the two political parties in the United States and the US government have always had unrealistic good wishes for the Chinese communist regime, eagerly hoping that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the CCP’s rule would become more liberal, even democratic, and a “responsible” power in the world. 

However, this US approach was a fundamental misunderstanding of the CCP’s real nature and longterm strategic goals. All along the CCP hid its real goals and intentions, so as to gain various benefits from the United States. Although there have been economic, political, and personnel changes within the two countries, as well as steady frictions, conflicts, and tensions in China-US relations, normal diplomatic relations between the two countries have been maintained and conflicts and risks have generally been kept under control. As a result, the effects of the engagement policy over the past half century have been multifaceted. 

On the one hand, engagement has helped the Chinese people to get rid of poverty and isolation and enter the international community, and it has also allowed civil society to emerge and gradually develop in China. On the other hand, the engagement policy has also hastened the rapid rise of China under the CCP’s neo-totalitarian rule. 

The CCP is determined to reframe the existing international order and norms and lead the world in the opposite direction of liberal democracy. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he has continued the diplomatic strategy toward the US established by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping—namely, to take advantage of the engagement policy to gain time to achieve the CCP’s goals. 

But, with China’s enhanced strength now, Xi Jinping has wrongly judged that the international configuration is “the East is rising and the West is declining,” and he has become more aggressive and outspoken about his strategic intention to displace the United States.

 As a result, in recent years, troubles and conflicts in China-US relations have continually increased, and the CCP has increasingly become the greatest challenge and greatest threat to postwar international relations, to the liberal system of freedom and democracy, and to the security of the United States. The March 22, 2021, clash between the top diplomatic officials of the two countries in Anchorage, Alaska, showed that the relationship between China and the US may return to the rivalrous state of fifty years ago. 

How the US government understands and handles China-US relations affects not only the well-being of the Chinese and American peoples but also the peace and stability of the world. As a former member of the CCP system, looking back at the changes in China-US relations over the past fifty years, I have three basic perspectives that I wish to share with Americans, so that they can more clearly see the CCP and its strategies for what they are.

First, in the more than seventy years since it came to power, the CCP has treated domestic and foreign affairs as “one integrated game,” with the top priority of strengthening the CCP’s control and preventing the collapse of the regime. In this regard, diplomacy is an extension of domestic affairs and is seen as a device to keep the party in power. 

Second, as far as the CCP’s global strategic objectives are concerned, China-US relations are the primary, and most important, factors among all. Therefore, the CCP’s attitude toward China-US relations and the engagement policy is determined by how well they serve the CCP’s internal political needs. 

Third, international engagement and economic development have failed to soften the political character of the CCP regime. Its combination of ideology and extreme repression make it a totalitarian regime, and the sophisticated digital nature of its surveillance and repression has given totalitarian control a new dimension. All of this makes China a more dangerous adversary for the United States. 

The “Honeymoon Period” of China-US Engagement Policy

 It was President Nixon who gave birth to the US policy of “engagement” with China. He not only saw a US alliance with China to contain the Soviet Union as a necessity from a geopolitical perspective, but he also viewed the significance of changing China-US relations from a long-term perspective of global security. 

Writing as early as 1967, Nixon stated, “Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside of the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.”

But Nixon forgot to ask if communist China could be easily integrated into the international community. On China’s side, it was Mao Zedong who opened the door, but it was Deng Xiaoping who established the strategic framework for China-US engagement. Deng’s positive attitude toward the engagement policy was due first to the fact that China’s economy was at the edge of collapse at the end of the Cultural Revolution. 

Meanwhile, choosing the United States in the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union at that time helped the CCP to rely on the strength of the US to reduce Soviet threats. China and the United States formally established diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. Following Deng Xiaoping’s historic visit to the US that month, large numbers of CCP officials also visited the US and European countries. 

These visits prompted the CCP’s  determination to open the country to promote reforms, and China began to experience remarkable changes. Deng Xiaoping was greatly impressed by his visit to the US. He had a classic saying: “After WWII, those who followed the U.S. have become rich, and those who opposed the U.S. are still poor.”2 In the early 1980s, all members of the CCP from the top down hoped to change China’s poverty and backwardness. When I lived in Suzhou in the 1980s, I once chatted with a senior reporter of the Suzhou Daily newspaper who had just interviewed a city official recently returned from his first visit to the United States. The reporter was expecting the official to talk about how US imperialism was struggling and dying. The reporter was stunned when he heard the official say, “Ah, now I know what a civilized life is. We are all barbarians here.” Of course, the interview was not published. In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping emphasized that since a third world war would not occur, China should take advantage of the historic opportunity to fully develop itself. The CCP and the government at national, provincial, and local levels enthusiastically promoted China-US friendship and opening to the outside world. Fourteen coastal cities were designated as Special Economic Zones, offering various preferential policies to attract foreign investment to China. At the same time, China sent students to the US and Europe to learn cutting-edge technology and social science theories. Then why, shortly after returning from his triumphal tour of the US, did Deng Xiaoping launch the war in the border region of China and Vietnam? There were two narratives circulating within the CCP at the time: one was that it was to “show a loyalty pledge” to the US, that China did not hesitate to teach its former “little brother” in the international communist movement a “lesson” in order to express sincere friendship with the US; the other was that Deng Xiaoping wanted to gain firm control of China’s military through this conflict. After the Sino-Vietnamese border war ended (and the Chinese people were never told how poorly our forces fared or how many of our soldiers died), Deng Xiaoping executed a demobilization plan, reducing the army by one million soldiers and converting militaryoriented enterprises to civilian production, thus saving military expenditures to develop the economy. He also formulated a three-step strategy. The goal was to make China a modern great power in the world by 2049, the centenary of the PRC. The acceleration of China’s economic growth was something that the US was happy to see. The US was looking forward to the gradual emergence of democracy in China in the course of economic changes. President Nixon said: “Thus, our aim—to the extent that we influence events—should be to induce change.”3 From the outset of the engagement policy, US strategy has been to produce liberal change in China—economically, socially, and politically. Perhaps what American officials did not expect was that Deng Xiaoping would delineate the boundaries of Chinese politics by setting down the Four Cardinal Principles: adherence to the socialist road, to the people’s democratic dictatorship, to the leadership of the Communist Party, and to Marxist and Mao Zedong Thought.4 From the very beginning, the CCP’s senior leaders have made it clear that the ultimate purpose of accepting and using the American engagement policy was to restore China’s economy in order to strengthen the CCP regime. Some space could be properly opened in the economic field, but in the political arena the Four Cardinal Principles must not be changed and the dominance of the CCP’s one-party rule must never be challenged. However, the simultaneous economic reforms and opening to the outside world brought in democratic ideas and universal values, thereby causing ideological confusion within the party and the country. As a certain liberalizing trend was under way and reformers within the party were proposing various alterations to classic Marxist theories in 1982–1983, the conservatives within the CCP could not tolerate it and countered with the “Spiritual Pollution Movement.” This campaign was short-lived, though, and by 1984 liberal leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were again pushing philosophical and political boundaries in a much more open and liberal direction.

very beginning, the CCP’s senior leaders have made it clear that the ultimate purpose of accepting and using the American engagement policy was to restore China’s economy in order to strengthen the CCP regime. Some space could be properly opened in the economic field, but in the political arena the Four Cardinal Principles must not be changed and the dominance of the CCP’s one-party rule must never be challenged. However, the simultaneous economic reforms and opening to the outside world brought in democratic ideas and universal values, thereby causing ideological confusion within the party and the country. As a certain liberalizing trend was under way and reformers within the party were proposing various alterations to classic Marxist theories in 1982–1983, the conservatives within the CCP could not tolerate it and countered with the “Spiritual Pollution Movement.” This campaign was short-lived, though, and by 1984 liberal leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were again pushing philosophical and political boundaries in a much more open and liberal direction. express doubts about US engagement policy toward China at the time, but they were in a distinct minority.6 Things that happened later proved that the doubts were justified, but US government leaders at the time did not pay much attention. The buy-in to the engagement theory was so pervasive among US policy elites that it had an intoxicating effect on them. The big fallacy of the engagement policy was in assuming that the CCP could be transformed to share power and accept democracy, and therefore it erred in engaging heavily with China’s elites rather than its people. 

Deng Xiaoping Clarified the Basic Strategic Framework for China-US Relations after the June 4 Incident 

The June 4 incident in 1989 and subsequent drastic political changes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe greatly shook the foundation of the CCP’s rule and shocked its top echelon. How to stabilize the domestic situation and ease international pressure as soon as possible became a major and urgent problem facing the CCP at that time. The subsequent overall framework of China-US relations and the engagement policy were gradually reset against that background. The incident on June 4, 1989, when the army opened fire on protesting citizens in Tiananmen Square and other parts of Beijing, shocked the world and caused immediate worldwide reactions, which put the CCP’s international reputation and relations under fire. The Group of Seven (G7) countries strongly condemned the action and instituted various sanctions against China. The CCP was very nervous at the time. First, the Tiananmen Square incident suddenly deteriorated China’s external international environment after a decade of positive engagement with the world. The events in China coincided with similar unrest in Eastern European countries, challenging communist rule there. Then, two years later, the political turmoil spread to the former Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was overthrown. Those inside the CCP could hardly believe these extraordinary events. These two factors exerted enormous pressure on the CCP, and an uneasy panic and fear permeated the party. Deng Xiaoping worked hard to restore the unfavorable political situation over the next year or so, trying to stabilize the party and the people internally, while externally trying to restore a normal international environment, especially in China-US relations. In response to international sanctions, Deng gave a talk inside the party, saying, in effect, why should we be afraid of the blockade? Before the reform and opening-up policy the CCP had been blockaded for thirty years, but the party and country survived. Deng also said that China’s one billion people were a “big market” and “we don’t need to beg the foreigners to come back—they will do so of their own volition, as they need us.”7 At the time, this internal speech was intended to stabilize the mood inside the party. But in July of the following year, when Deng met with former Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau, he clearly expressed this opinion more openly.8 Meanwhile, the CCP issued multiple directives to combat corruption, rectify the party’s work style, establish an internal reporting system (whereby party members report on others), and adjust the relationship between the CCP and other Chinese “democratic parties” (the eight “united front” parties that are permitted to exist to give the façade that the CCP shares power) as well as with the general public to alleviate public grievances and stabilize the domestic situation. The turning point was Deng Xiaoping’s misjudgment that the US was behind the 1989 prodemocracy protests. In their aftermath Deng frequently met with international figures, private or official, as well as semiofficial dignitaries from the US. His words were soft but tough, trying his best to repair foreign relations, especially with Washington, yet he made unfounded countercharges. Deng specifically blamed the June 4 incident on Western countries and the United States, saying: “The Western world really wanted chaos in China. . . . The United States, as well as some other Western countries, have engaged in peaceful evolution towards capitalism in socialist countries. The United States is waging a smokeless world war without gunpowder.”9 In another meeting with the prime minister of Thailand, Deng Xiaoping said, “China, among the countries in the world, is least afraid of isolation, blockade, and sanctions. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, we have been in a position of being isolated, blocked, and sanctioned for decades. But in the end, it has not harmed us much. Facts show that those who want to sanction us are beginning to learn their lessons.”10 In a meeting with former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, Deng said: “After we put down the rebellion, the Group of Seven summit meeting issued a declaration imposing sanctions on China. What qualifies them to do that? Who granted them the authority? Their talk about human rights, freedom and democracy is only designed to safeguard the interests of the strong, rich countries, which pursue hegemony and practice power politics. We never listen to such stuff.”11 Then Deng met with former US president Nixon on October 31, 1989. He first gratuitously praised Nixon and said: “I appreciate your opinion very much. When considering the relationship between countries, we should primarily proceed from our own country’s strategic interests. . . . So, your trip to China in 1972 was not only a wise but also a very brave action.” Then, Deng defended the shooting and poured a pot of dirty water over the conversation: “Frankly, the recent disturbances and counter-revolutionary rebellion that took place in Beijing were fanned by [the forces of] international anti-communism and antisocialism. It is a pity that the United States was so deeply involved in this matter and that it keeps denouncing China. Actually, it is China that is the real victim. China has not done anything to harm the United States.” Then, after trying to justify his and the CCP’s actions to use force, Deng took an even tougher stand, telling Nixon: “I would like you to tell President Bush that the United States should take the initiative in putting the past behind us, because only your country can do that. . . . The U.S. is strong and China is weak; China is the victim. Don’t ever expect China to beg the United States to lift the sanctions. If they lasted a hundred years, the Chinese would not do that.” In the end, Deng did not forget to gratuitously remind Nixon of the Chinese market as a temptation: “The Chinese market is not fully developed yet, and the United States can take advantage of it in many ways. We shall be happy to have American merchants continue doing business with China. This could be an important way of putting the past behind us.”12 Looking back today, we can see that Deng’s talks were indeed very clever. It was clear that he was the perpetrator, but he described himself, the CCP, and China as the victim. Deng blamed the June 4 incident on Western countries and the United States because that was badly needed to quell the discontent of the entire party and all the people in the country over the shooting.

Defying the national mood of censure in the United States, President Bush seemed desperate to get the relationship back on track (another example of American naïveté). Bush dispatched his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, to Beijing on two secret trips, in July and December 1989. Instead of keeping Deng isolated and on the defensive, Bush’s initiative appeared groveling and played into Deng’s hands. The Chinese public had no way to know of these secret visits; even we in the central party apparatus did not know. When Deng met with Scowcroft his attitude was tough and condescending, but he also held out an olive branch: “China cannot be a threat to the United States, and the US should not treat China as a threatening rival. We have never done anything to harm the U.S. . . . If both sides make concessions, we can reach a settlement acceptable to both.”13 Scowcroft, the well-mannered “gentleman” American diplomat, was not confrontational. He used humble diplomatic etiquette to defuse the embarrassing atmosphere of concealed confrontation during the meeting with Deng, and this perhaps made a bad start for the subsequent handling of conflicts in China-US relations. After more than a year of internal and external adjustments, Deng Xiaoping gradually formulated the CCP’s basic domestic and international policies to deal with the June 4 Tiananmen Square incident and the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. In a speech announcing his retirement on September 4, 1989, to the Central Committee, Deng observed:

I think the upheavals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were inevitable. . . . There is no doubt that the imperialists want socialist countries to change their nature. The problem now is not whether the banner of the Soviet Union will fall—there is bound to be unrest there—but whether the banner of China will fall. . . . As long as China doesn’t collapse, one fifth of the world’s population will be upholding socialism. . . . In short, my views about the international situation can be summed up in three sentences. First, we should observe the situation coolly. Second, we should hold our ground. Third, we should act calmly. Don’t be impatient; it is no good to be impatient. We should be calm, calm, and calm again.14

At first Deng declared a twelve-character policy, but later it turned to the twenty-fourcharacter policy “stabilize the position, observe calmly, take all in stride, never take the lead, and hide our capacity to bide our time.” The latter phrase, taoguang yanghui (韬光养晦), became famous as Deng’s famous dictum to guide foreign policy. Most people don’t know that it was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc that triggered Deng’s taoguang yanghui strategy. A group of CCP top-ranking cadres came to Deng after the collapse, urging that China take over the leadership of the world communist community. Deng insisted that “we should not stick our neck out” (不当头) but must “hide our capacity to bide our time.” Deng handled internal affairs and diplomacy in a comprehensive way and emphasized several points to the CCP. His political brilliance and experience enabled him to see clearly 

All of these factors make it possible that any unexpected event may cause a chain reaction leading to huge changes in the situation and even the collapse of the regime. Recall that no one predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union or other communist states in Eastern Europe—yet they occurred. A sudden and instant collapse triggered by random events will almost inevitably bring disorder and chaos within China, which will reverberate outside the country. Therefore, the US must have a clear-eyed understanding and prepare for unpredictable contingencies.

 • • •  (conclusion & summary)

In this essay, I have put forward several interrelated arguments.

First, the CCP regime is a refined neo-totalitarian rather than an authoritarian system. 

Second, the top priority of the CCP’s international relations, especially with the US, is to strengthen its internal control and prevent the collapse of the regime. 

Third, the nature of the relationship between China and the US is actually one of adversaries and rivals rather than competitors. 

Fourth, both countries are large and possess considerable strength. Neither one can swallow the other, and a “hot war” between the two would be calamitous for the world. It is on this basic assessment that I suggest that the US needs to clearly see the CCP and PRC for what they are—strategic adversaries—and thus forge its strategies and policies toward China accordingly. 

Wishful thinking about “engagement” must be replaced by hardheaded defensive measures to protect the United States from the CCP’s aggression—while bringing offensive pressures to bear on it, as the Chinese Communist Party is much more fragile than Americans assume. 

NOTES