Wednesday, September 30, 2020

NYC Indoor Dining: The Math Simply Doesn't Work, Restaurants Say - Bloomberg

NYC Indoor Dining: The Math Simply Doesn't Work, Restaurants Say - Bloomberg





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What you need to know:Tracking the Reopening of New York
City
NYC Reopens
‘We Might Not Make It’: The Math Simply Doesn’t Work for NYC
Restaurants
Even New York City’s most successful restaurateurs are
struggling with the harsh economic realities wrought by the pandemic.

By Kate Krader
September 30, 2020, 1:00 PM GMT+1
A sign notifies customers to keep a mask on while returning
to tables at Crown Shy in downtown Manhattan. New York City will allow indoor
dining at 25% capacity from Sept. 30.
A sign notifies customers to keep a mask on while returning
to tables at Crown Shy in downtown Manhattan. New York City will allow indoor
dining at 25% capacity from Sept. 30. Photographer: David Dee Delgado/Bloomberg

For more and more New York City restaurants, the math isn’t
working.

Even as they prepare to reopen indoor dining on Sept. 30
after a six-month, pandemic-induced shutdown, many restaurateurs worry they
will struggle merely to get by. A
mandated cap on capacity will guarantee that three out of four tables stay
empty. And as fall turns to winter, outdoor dining will become even less
attractive. Everyone agrees more establishments will close for good.

Here’s a look at how four restaurants are coping as indoor
dining resumes.

THE DUTCH, SoHo
25% indoor capacity: 30 seats
Sept. revenue: roughly $175,000
Same month a year ago: about $500,000
Labor costs as percentage of sales: over 60%
Pre-pandemic: under 40%
Rent: $45,000 a month
Last paid: March

 “For most
restaurants, it’s not month to month,
it’s week to week,
” says Luke Ostrom, managing partner at NoHo Hospitality
Group, which owns The Dutch and nine other New York establishments, seven of
which are open. “They’re not sitting on piles of cash for a rainy day.”

“If the landlord says, ‘You owe me every penny since
March,’ almost no restaurant will have the ability to pay it all back.”

Ostrom says his group is in the process of renegotiating a
lease that would give its landlord a percentage of the profits, a structure
employed by many food halls and hotel restaurants. At the start of the
pandemic, Ostrom’s group laid off 98% of its staff; a little over 30% have been
hired back
, he says.

A lot of the difficulties of running a New York City
restaurant during the pandemic stem from the fixed costs. At The Dutch, Ostrom has to employ the same number of
line cooks — five — at 25% indoor capacity as he would if seating went up to
75%. The price of perishable goods has also crept up, accounting for a third
of monthly revenue.
Meanwhile, his restaurants also had to absorb the
cost of protective equipment, from gloves to masks and filters
, which has
run in the “thousands and thousands of dollars,” Ostrom estimates.

While the Paycheck Protection Program helped Ostrom relaunch
his restaurants, the PPP loans for The Dutch expire on Oct. 1. After that, the
restaurant has to rely on its own cash reserves — at a time when plummeting
temperatures may crimp demand for outdoor dining. Congress may vote on a $120
billion restaurant bailout as early as next week, providing much-needed support
to the ailing industry. But for now, Ostrom is hoping his restaurants can soon
restart hosting private events,
which will help offset the drop-off in revenue.

“Places that are only doing 35% of previous sales, without
an influx of cash or forgiveness of debt, they’ll close,” he predicts. “50%
capacity is the baseline threshold for restaurants surviving.”

CROWN SHY, Financial District

A New York Restaurant Prepares For The Return Of Indoor
Dining
25% indoor capacity: 62 seats
Estimated loss in Oct., including outdoor dining: over
$80,000
Oct. ’19 revenue: $1 million
Rent: usually 10% of each month’s revenue
Last paid: March
Jeff Katz, owner of the modern American restaurant Crown
Shy, agrees that without private events, his business may be doomed. “Even with
a good landlord, a good first year, good head winds, we might not make it,”
says Katz, who opened Crown Shy just last year and is also general manager at
the Italian restaurant Del Posto. “For many restaurants, December and the
holiday season can bring in more than one-third of the entire year’s profits,”
he observes.

Katz says Crown Shy’s revenue last October was a little over
$1 million. This year, at 25% occupancy and even with outdoor dining, he
estimates the restaurant will lose over $80,000 after all the expenses, including
rent, labor and food, are paid. For November, he estimates he might be able to
clear $9,000 — what he calls “breaking even” — assuming the capacity cap
doubles to 50% by then. “Nothing is more important than getting to 50, then 75,
then 100% occupancy,” he says.

PETER LUGER STEAK HOUSE, Williamsburg

relates to ‘We Might Not Make It’: The Math Simply Doesn’t
Work for NYC Restaurants
Socially distanced dining tables at Peter LugerCourtesy:
Peter Luger Steak House
25% indoor capacity: 90 seats
Estimated decline in Sept. revenue versus ’19: roughly 75%
Labor costs as percentage of revenue: “definitely higher
than last year”
Food costs: 50%
Rent: none
David Berson, co-owner of the venerable steakhouse, says
he’s one of the lucky ones. He doesn’t have to worry about rent — Luger owns
its property. He’s brought back over 90% of its staff, including more than 40
servers. And he intends to keep the establishment’s roughly 60 outdoor seats
and add electric heaters, in addition to the 90 inside the restaurant.

“It will be almost a server per table,” Berson says, half
jokingly. But even he’s worried. “My fear is that we get stuck at 25% indoors
when it’s too cold for comfortable outdoor dining.”

While having outdoor dining has helped, he says the average
check per table is lower than what he would expect for indoor tables because
patrons inside tend to stay longer and drink more.


relates to ‘We Might Not Make It’: The Math Simply Doesn’t
Work for NYC Restaurants
Tocqueville’s pre-pandemic seating arrangement Courtesy:
Tocqueville
25% indoor capacity: 25 seats
Projected decline in full-year revenue versus ’19: over 65%
Estimated labor costs as percentage of revenue in Oct.: 75%
Food costs: 40%
Rent and utilities: 25%
Because of the impact from the virus, Marco Moreira says
he’s combining the two restaurants he owns, French restaurant Tocqueville and
sushi destination 15 East, which are just steps apart in Union Square, into one
space with a combined menu. Moreira estimates he’s already spent around
$150,000 to “keep the lights on during Covid,” for everything from insurance to
utility bills and a minimal staff. He says it will cost an additional $100,000
to reopen, which includes an outdoor patio that he bought essentially at cost
for $35,000 and a filtration system upgrade for about $15,000.

At the existing Tocqueville location, he negotiated with the
landlord to pay rent based on percentage of sales. In September alone, labor
costs exceeded revenue by 25% and he expects to lose money again in October.
Moreira doesn’t anticipate any profit this year.

“If I break even,” he says, “I’m lucky.”


Tuesday, September 29, 2020

Markets Can Be a Blight or a Blessing in Pandemics - btbirkett@gmail.com - Gmail

Markets Can Be a Blight or a Blessing in Pandemics - btbirkett@gmail.com - Gmail



Disease, Finance and Unintended Consequences

What  will be the long-term consequences of the pandemic? Few if any answers are clear. In the financial realm, markets have automatic checks, balances and stabilizers. Tracing the impact of the last few months into the future soon becomes like plotting out an attack in chess. You can try to predict how the opponent will react, but you cannot know. A few unexpected moves could end your strategy. With this in mind, here are two historic pandemics whose financial ramifications were hard to predict at the time.
Potato Blight:
The disease that started to spread through the Irish potato crop 175 years ago would lead to appalling suffering, and changed the course of history. Without the Potato Famine, it is unlikely the U.S. would have benefited from the influx of Irish immigrants who went on to hold great influence. Three presidents to date have been descended from migrants who fled the famine; Kennedy, Reagan and Obama. Joe Biden would be a fourth. 
Without the famine, the progress of Irish independence from the U.K. would almost certainly have been different. Ireland’s Civil War, the Troubles in Ulster, and the writhing over Brexit might all have been altered. Demographically, the impact of the famine and the emigration it spurred can still be felt. Last year, Ireland had 4.9 million people — the most in more than a century, but still below the 5.1 million recorded in 1850. Over the same period, the population of England and Wales rose to 59.4 million from 17.9 million.  
This episode played out in the home territory of what was then the most powerful country in the world. How could this have been allowed to happen? From the first, historians have come up with starkly differing explanations. Plausible comparisons have been made to the Holocaust, with Irish historians arguing that the British were guilty of deliberate genocide. Tony Blair, when U.K. prime minister, made a formal apology to Ireland for doing too little; but the free-market theorists at the Mises Institute suggest that “the English government was guilty of doing too much.” Had they not intervened in the workings of the free market, the libertarian argument goes, Ireland would have dealt with the epidemic far better. 
But one of the most interesting ideas I have heard comes from the Cambridge historian Charles Read in Laissez‐Faire, the Irish Famine, and British Financial Crisis. He discussed this with British historian Dan Snow on the History Hit podcast, which I thoroughly recommend. He argues that the British response was undermined by financial mismanagement that led to a crisis startlingly similar in its fundamentals to those of our time. In outline, it is clear that after Robert Peel gave way to Lord Russell as prime minister, Irish taxes were hiked, and grants became loans that would need to be repaid:


To be clear, nothing exculpates the British. But why exactly did they reverse course this badly? Read suggests we should blame the bond market. This is what happened to the interest rates on consols, which dominated Treasury lending at the time, after the government attempted to borrow more money to deal with the famine:


The bond market was in revolt. So was the gold market. Britain in those days was as financially dominant as the U.S. is now, but it didn’t have the exorbitant privilege of printing more of its own currency at will. It was still tied to the gold standard, and already had a lot of outstanding debt from its successful wars earlier in the century. So, as British politicians tried to raise money to fund the Irish relief effort, investors decided that they wanted their money from the Bank of England in gold, not paper:


The last six months would have been very different, and probably much more painful, had the dollar still been tied to gold. In the 19th century, the British resorted to putting the burden for the Irish relief efforts on to the Irish themselves, and hiked taxes many times over. The result was famine and death, and a mass emigration whose effects are still felt today. 

Spanish Flu:
Covid-19 is arguably the worst pandemic since the “Spanish” influenza of 1918. Thankfully, the coronavirus has turned out to be far less deadly. But the after-effects of the Spanish flu suggest that the financial impact can be counterintuitive. You would think that an epochal pandemic would inflict terrible damage on the life insurance industry. But it didn’t. 
A new research paper by Gustavo Cortes of the University of Florida and Gertjan Verdickt of Monash University suggests that the Spanish flu was a “blessing in disguise” for American life insurers. You can find a brief video on Twitter here, and the full paper here.
As might be expected, death claims rose sharply during the first year of the pandemic:


But importantly for the industry, they then fell sharply to lower rates than in much of the preceding decade. The disease had brought forward many deaths; after a bump in 1918, that left fewer fatalities than usual in the following years. Meanwhile, the pandemic ensured much stronger demand. People who might have tried to get by without insurance a few years earlier rushed to buy in 1919.
Life insurers’ shares, having been dented briefly while the pandemic was raging, made up all the lost ground within months of the end:


With investors able to see the near-term outlook was good, companies were able to raise far more money in equity offerings:


Meanwhile, new incorporations of life companies surged in 1919, again making it easier for the industry to absorb the impact of the pandemic:


With the potato blight, financial mechanisms magnified a public health crisis into a humanitarian and economic catastrophe. After the Spanish flu, financial markets helped the country minimize the damage. Bear this disparity in mind when trying to predict how they will deal with the aftermath of Covid-19.

Monday, September 28, 2020

Endowments' Hedge Fund Bet Has Time on Its Side - btbirkett@gmail.com - Gmail

Endowments' Hedge Fund Bet Has Time on Its Side - btbirkett@gmail.com - Gmail



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Returns for the Well-Endowed

Most of us want to take the long-term perspective, but cannot. There are too many needs that come up in the short term, and too many risks in the next days, weeks or months that make it harder to get through to the next decades. That is the main reason why the big university endowments are so envied, and so admired. Even more than pension fund managers, those running endowments can look decades into the future, and they can even call on the best ideas in academe.
What follows is by far the most famous asset allocation in the endowment world, and one of the most influential experiments in long-term asset allocation of our time. It shows the great shift that David Swensen has made in the Yale University endowment since he took over in 1986. Domestic equities were the bulk of the portfolio he inherited; they now account for only 2.7%. It didn’t have hedge funds or private equity at the time; now these alternative assets make up more than half Yale’s assets:
Under Swensen, Yale’s endowment has been mighty successful, and his success has inspired movements by many other managers into alternatives and real assets.
The critical advantage of the big endowments is that they have the liberty to look to the long run. That raises the question of what they have done and how they have performed over the very long term. And a fascinating new paper by Elroy Dimson, David Chambers and Charikleia Kaffe, all of the Centre for Endowment Asset Management at the University of Cambridge’s Judge Business School, pieces together what the eight Ivy League endowments have done along with four of the most famous non-Ivy universities (Chicago, Johns Hopkins, MIT and Stanford). This is a major historical undertaking, and they had to use the book values of the equities that the endowments held in the early years. The results come up to 2017, so they include the Lehman crisis and its aftermath, but are unaffected by Covid-19.
This, according to Dimson, Chambers and Kaffe is how allocations to the core asset classes of fixed income and public equities have moved since the turn of the last century:
In 1900, the big endowments did little more than lend to safe borrowers, generally the government. Those bond allocations have now been stripped back to a bare minimum. Meanwhile, they became largely vehicles for equities by mid-century, and benefited to the full from the bull markets from 1950 to 2000. However, they were already beginning to cut back on equities at that point. This process has carried on in a big way in the last two decades.
Now, let’s look at their investments in real estate, traditionally a core investment for an endowment, and alternative assets:
Real estate matters less and less to endowments. (The outlier that had more than half of its portfolio in real estate for much of the 20th century is Columbia University, which is blessed with a lot of property in Manhattan). Meanwhile, alternative assets have exploded. Endowments were already putting a lot of money to work in hedge funds by the time the dotcom bubble burst and the surge for value stocks that followed it gave hedge funds their greatest opportunity to shine. Large numbers of other asset managers rushed to join them. Of course, those bets in recent years aren’t generally working out very well, thanks to low interest rates and the persistent bull market in equities. For the last decade, a simple investment in a passive tracker fund following the S&P 500 would have done better than the overwhelming majority of hedge funds
This has absolutely not deterred the big endowments from keeping money tied up in alternative assets, however. The following chart from Dimson, Chambers and Kaffe shows the proportions kept in alts by the “Big 3” (Harvard, Yale and Princeton), the other Ivies, the non-Ivy universities they followed and the average recorded by the large group of endowments that these days report their numbers to the National Association of College and University Business Officers each year:
The big three have led the way, with the rest of the university sector persistently playing catch-up. But the pain of 2008, which left several big endowments in difficulties as they tried to raise cash to make the regular annual payments they are required to make to their universities, seems to have had little effect. Neither have the growing difficulties for the hedge fund sector. Instead, universities across the spectrum have poured more money into alts in the last decade, and those that had less before have been even more aggressive. 
The critical question is whether this will work out for them. Calculating exactly how to benchmark an endowment is difficult, but since 1900 the data from Dimson, Chambers and Kaffe suggests that they have performed well. Here are their raw growth numbers since 1900. (Johns Hopkins appears worse than the others because its data only start in 1926, and it missed out on some of the good years at the beginning of the century):
All have compounded real growth for more than a century, and a massive accumulation of assets has resulted. Now, look at the numbers Dimson, Chambers and Kaffe produced once they broke down the returns into the standard measures of risk — geometric and arithmetic return, the standard deviation showing the typical volatility, and the Sharpe Ratio, which divides return by the standard deviation for a risk-adjusted version of return. They put this data together for the period from 1950 to 2017: 
So for those keeping score, Princeton narrowly beat Yale for the strongest risk-adjusted return. All of the universities managed a Sharpe ratio equal to or better than the risk-adjusted return that would have been available from going long equities throughout the 67 years, with the narrow exception of Brown, which had a Sharpe ratio of 0.47 compared to equities’ 0.48. None managed an arithmetic return quite as good as could have been achieved by going 100% long equities; all did far better than government or corporate bonds, which had made up the great majority of their portfolios at the beginning of the century. 
Now, the endowment sector has made what could almost be called a counter-cyclical bet on alternatives, at a time when it would have been easier to load up on public equities. And this, it turns out, is typical of their behavior. The greatest advantage of their long-term outlook is that they are free to be counter-cyclical. Institutional investors tend to be guilty of herding, for example blatantly crowding in to internet stocks in the late 1990s. This isn’t necessarily because they were dumb or easily misled, but more because they had big institutional incentives to do what everyone else was doing. Herding is a natural result from judging investors against their peers, rather than against some distinct and absolute benchmark.
The endowment managers certainly do have some sense of competing with each other. When speaking off the record, there is a lot of schadenfreude about the difficulties in recent years of Harvard, which continues to have the largest endowment. But since 1900, on average, endowments have been very counter-cyclical, cutting equity exposures a little ahead of major stock market crises, and loading up on stocks immediately afterward. These are the crises that Dimson, Chambers and Kaffe used in the research:
1.Panic of 1906–1907 (for which economist Robert Shiller estimates a decline of –38%)
2.Wall Street Crash of 1929 (–84%)
3.Economic recession of 1937 (–45%)
4.Stock market crash of 1973–1974 (–25%)
5.Bursting of the dotcom bubble of 2000 (–43%)
6.GFC of 2008 (–51%)
And this is how the big endowments shifted their allocations to equities in the three years before and after these big market breaks:
Being able to look to the very long term does, it emerges from this evidence, help investors deliver bigger returns. It’s not a luxury that many of us have, but the more we can try to look to the long term, and look through the turbulence straight ahead, the more things will tend to work out. 

75 Years of FAJ

The work by Dimson, Chambers and Kaffe was commissioned to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Financial Analysts Journal, which has guided the debate between investors and theoretical academics over how to manage money ever since. This is what its first issue, initially known as the Journal of Finance, looked like:
These day, the FAJ is primarily about asset management, and it is run by the CFA Institute, which controls the CFA designation and effectively leads the profession. It is edited by a Who’s Who of the great and the good in the investment world. Time spent digging around for research on the FAJ’s website is almost always well spent.
That doesn’t mean, however, that we can’t poke fun at it. In the lead up to the 75th anniversary, someone somewhere started publishing on Twitter the “Journal of Rearview Mirror Portfolio Management”, in the style of the FAJ. The lead item was called: “Endowment Performance: What You Should Have Done 10 Years Ago.” Here is the cover:
A second edition has since plugged a landmark piece from 2006 recommending diversification by investing in commodity futures, which sparked a big rush into the asset class just in time for the beginning of the current commodity bear market. There is also a trail for a piece on “How Mad-Libs, Astrology and a Gluten-Free Diet Can Generate Alpha (and Clicks).” by Mebane Faber, the quant who serves as chief investment officer of Cambria  Investment Management, and who has deservedly amassed a large and devoted podcast following.  
Unfortunately, the rear-view mirror is always going to be clearer than the view ahead. It’s still fair to say that the FAJ will help you see what’s happened behind even more clearly, and that is very useful.

Saturday, September 26, 2020

ETF News: Diversity Is The Secret Behind Ark's Success - Bloomberg

ETF News: Diversity Is The Secret Behind Ark's Success - Bloomberg



Secret Sauce Behind Ark Success Is
Cathie Wood’s Diverse Team
By Claire Ballentine
September 26, 2020, 9:00 AM EDT
 Firm runs three of
the top 10 performing ETFs this year

Cathie Wood’s Ark Investment Management is well known for
its wildly optimistic price target for Tesla Inc., its money-spinning bet on
Bitcoin and the 81% return of its main
fund this year.
It’s less well known that almost none of its analysts has a
finance background.

Instead, their previous careers include cancer researcher,
artificial intelligence expert, gaming engineer -- even sailboat captain.

The 27-person team
-- one-quarter people of color, 30% women and most in their 20s -- has built
funds around companies with the potential to shape the future, including
fintech, space and imaging. Wood attributes many of her firm’s successes to her
analysts’ wide range of experiences.

“You’re probably not going to find a more diversified group
of people,” Wood said. “They already have one foot in the new world, and they
are extremely creative in terms of figuring out how the world is going to
work.”


Sam Korus, the former sailboat captain, is an analyst for
autonomous technology and robotics. Other Ark analysts’ areas of focus include
gaming, AI in health care and genetic technologies.

Wood, who is 64, said that if Ark hadn’t hired analysts
who’d experimented with CRISPR gene editing technology, “I wouldn’t even know
what it was.”

Ark analyst James Wang focuses on AI and the next wave of the
Internet. He previously worked for Nvidia and wrote tech columns for an
Australian magazine. He joined the firm in 2015 after he heard Wood speaking on
Bloomberg Radio, guessed her email address and reached out.

“If we all came from a financial background, we would
inevitability have views that are much more similar and more aligned with the
current price expectations set by the market,” Wang said.

Different Experiences
While Ark’s gender distribution is about average for the
securities industry, according to U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data, the
firm’s racial diversity is far from the norm. Out of more than 80 members of
executive teams at the nation’s top banks, only one is Black. Numbers for the
ETF industry aren’t available, but anecdotal evidence suggests it’s also
lacking.

Chief Compliance Officer Kellen Carter, who is African
American, joined Ark in 2016 in part because of the inclusive environment that
Wood created.

“It’s an example of how diversity can make companies more
efficient and productive because of the diversity of experience that we all
bring to the table,” he said.

Studies back this up. McKinsey & Co. found that businesses
in the top quartile for ethnic diversity outperformed those in the bottom
quartile by 36%
.

Ark has consistently racked up strong returns since first
betting on Bitcoin in 2015. Over five years, Ark has three of the top 15 U.S. equity funds in terms of performance in
the past five years. In that period, her Ark Next Generation Internet ETF
(ARKW) has annualized returns of more than 41%, compared to 22% for tech
darling Invesco QQQ Trust Series 1 (QQQ).

More Than Tesla
Wood has gotten plenty of headlines for her bullish calls
for Tesla -- her current price target for the stock is $7,000 by 2024. Yet she
pushes back on skeptics who say the 81% gains in the ARK Innovation ETF this
year were due to a lucky bet on the electric carmaker. According to Wood’s
calculation, if ARKK’s Tesla stake was in cash, the fund would still be up
43% year-to-date through Sept. 17
thanks to her team’s other bets. Compare
this with the Nasdaq gain in the same period of 26.9%.

And she’s still a believer. After Tesla plunged 21% earlier
this month, Wood boosted ARKK’s Tesla position to 10.7% from 9.9%. She said
that she still thinks Tesla will see “surprising growth.”

ARKK has taken in
more than $4 billion this year
“There’s always some luck involved when you have active
management,
that’s part of it,” said Nate Geraci, president of the ETF
Store. “But what you want in an active manager is somebody who has conviction,
and they’ve put their money where their mouth is.”

Tossing the Playbook
Ark also sets itself apart from other firms through its open research ecosystem that Wood
devised to promote ideas on social media.

Unlike other fund managers who closely guard their tactics,
Wood’s strategies are all available on Ark’s website, along with articles,
podcasts, videos, white papers and newsletters.

Giving away trade secrets seems counterintuitive, but Wood
says it sparks wide-ranging discussions that add to Ark’s strategies. For
instance, Venkat Viswanathan, an associate engineering professor at Carnegie
Mellon University who focuses on energy conversion and storage, now frequently
shares his latest work with Ark analysts.

“Business questions are cross disciplinary in nature, so you
need expertise from different angles,” Viswanathan said. “Having a diverse and
close-knit team of analysts positions them very, very nicely.”

Next Generation
Wood said that her parents, who immigrated to the U.S. from
Ireland, had always encouraged her to pursue any career she wanted. She used
their name in founding the Duddy Innovation Institute at her alma mater, Notre
Dame Academy High School in Los Angeles, in 2018.

The students begin the program studying a Wood hallmark --
disruptive innovation -- before diving into areas like genomics and robotics.
Wood said she’s already received questions from them that made her rethink a
few positions. Some of these teenagers might even end up at Ark.

“I would love to bring some of these young people, get them
through college and give them a shot,” Wood said.

California Burnin’ — a Warning Against One-Party Rule - Bloomberg

California Burnin’ — a Warning Against One-Party Rule - Bloomberg





California Burnin’ — a Warning
Against One-Party Rule
Fires, blackouts, high taxes, poverty, scarce housing, urban
squalor, lousy schools — it’s a wonder anybody stays.

By Niall Ferguson
September 20, 2020, 1:00 PM GMT+1

 “California, folks,
is America fast forward.” Thus said Governor Gavin Newsom, hoarsely, amid brown
smoke at the North Complex Fire on Sept. 11. “What we’re experiencing right
here is coming to a community all across the United States of America … unless
we get our act together on climate change.”

I was with him all the way until he said the words “on
climate change.”

As my Hoover Institution colleague Victor Davis Hanson put
it last month, California is “the
progressive model of the future
: a once-innovative, rich state that is
now a civilization in near ruins
. The nation should watch us this election
year and learn of its possible future.”

Let’s start with the fires.
So far this year, they have torched more than five times as much land as
the average of the previous 33 years, killing 25 people and forcing about
100,000 people from their homes. At one point, three of the largest fires in
the state’s history were burning simultaneously in a ring around the San
Francisco Bay Area. According to the California Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection, or CAL FIRE, of the 10 largest fires since 1970, five broke out
this year. Nine out of 10 have occurred since 2012.

No doubt high temperatures and unusual thunderstorms bear
some of the responsibility for this year’s terrifying wildfires on the West
Coast. It is deeply misleading to claim, as some diehard deniers still do, that
temperatures aren’t rising and making wildfires more likely. But it is equally misleading to claim, as the New York
Times did last week, that “scientists say” climate change “is the primary
cause
of the conflagration.”

In reality, as Stanford’s Rebecca Miller, Christopher Field
and Katharine J. Mach argue in a recent article in Nature Sustainability, this
crisis has at least as much to do with disastrous
land mismanagement
as with climate change, and perhaps more. Anyone who
thinks solar panels, Teslas and a $3.3 billion white elephant of a high-speed
rail line will avoid comparable or worse fires next year (and the year after
and the year after) doesn’t understand what the scientists are really saying.

Most measures proposed by environmentalists to reduce carbon dioxide and other “greenhouse
gas” emissions will pay off over 50 to 100 years, as the International Panel on
Climate Change has long made clear. Even a best-case scenario of “stringent
mitigation” (what the IPCC calls Representative Concentration Pathway 2.6)
would not bring carbon dioxide emissions down to 1950 levels until around 2050.
Nor would it lower global average temperatures; it would merely stop them
rising
.

And that’s only if the whole world — including China and
India
— takes action. California’s wildfire problem cannot be solved by the
state’s citizens “getting their act together on climate change,” in Newsom’s
words. The problem needs immediately effective action — and that means a return to sane forest management, if
such a return is still possible. For decades, Democratic leaders in California
have presided over a policy of leaving dead trees to rot, instead of the old
and rational system of prescribed or
controlled burns
, not least because environmental and clear air
regulations, as well as problems of legal liability
, made controlled burns
harder and harder to do.

In prehistoric
California
, according to a recent analysis in ProPublica, between 4.4 million and 11.8 million acres burned
each year
. California’s
land managers burned about 30,000 acres a year on average between 1982 and
1998. Over the next 18 years, that number dropped to an annual 13,000 acres.
The result has been a huge accumulation of highly flammable kindling.
 

Miller, Field and Mach concluded that a total area of around
20 million acres — roughly one-fifth of the state’s territory — was in urgent need
of “fuel treatment,” meaning prescribed burns, mechanical thinning and
managed wildfire
. It is hard to imagine anything remotely close to that
happening under the current political dispensation. (The authors politely
called for “fundamental shifts in prescribed-burn policies, beyond those
currently under consideration.”) Or rather, it is going to happen, but at a
time of Nature’s choosing, with catastrophic consequences.

A case in point: For a year and a half, red tape slowed down
a forest-thinning project
in Berry Creek
, Butte County. The project covered just 54 acres
but, thanks to the burdensome provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act, work had yet to start when the
North Complex wildfire struck, devastating the town and killing 10 people.

I have some skin in this game. Four years ago, I moved from
Harvard University to Stanford University. My family traded a solid,
century-old professorial residence in Cambridge for a wooden house in a wooded
area that to our wooden heads seemed most idyllic. A few weeks ago, our
neighborhood was on the edge of the evacuation zone.

However, I have less skin in the game than Victor Davis
Hanson. He lives on the fruit and nut farm near Selma, in the Central Valley,
that his family has owned since the 1870s. The air quality index in Stanford rose above 170 on three days in
the last month. In Selma last week it was 460.
(Anything above 301 qualifies as “
emergency conditions.”)

I write these words over 1,000 miles from our California
home, but it’s no good: in recent days the smoke has found us, too. Hotel
parking lots full of vehicles with CA license plates confirm that we are not
the only eastward migrants. It’s like Steinbeck’s
“Grapes of Wrath” in reverse:
Now that the Golden State is the Char-Grilled
State, Californians have become the new Okies, though a good deal less
impecunious.

Yet wildfires are only one of the reasons people are fleeing
California. In addition, the wrongheaded
environmental policies
of the sages of Sacramento have so undermined the
power grid (for example, by shutting down gas-fired power plants and
refusing to count hydroelectric energy as renewable
) that residents have
been subjected to rolling blackouts
this year. The same policies have largely killed off the oil and gas industry.
Newsom & Co. have failed to upgrade
the water system
to keep pace with the last half-century of population
growth.

It’s not that California politicians don’t know how to spend
money. Back in 2007, total state spending was $146 billion. Last year it was
$215 billion. I know, I know: In real terms California’s GDP increased by
nearly a third in the same period. And I know: If it were an independent
nation it would be the fifth-largest economy in the world, ahead of India’s.
But for how much longer
will that be true?

California’s taxes aren’t the highest in the country — for
the median household. But the tax system
is one of the most progressive, with a 13.3% top tax rate on incomes
above $1 million — and that’s no longer deductible from the federal tax bill as
it used to be. The top 1% of taxpayers (those earning more than $500,000) now
account for half of personal income-tax revenue. And there’s worse to come.

The latest brilliant ideas in Sacramento are to raise the
top income rate up to 16.8% and to levy a wealth tax (0.4% on personal fortunes
over $30 million)
that you couldn’t even avoid paying if you left the
state. (The proposal envisages payment for up to 10 years after departure to a
lower-tax state.) It is a strange place that seeks to repel the rich while making itself a magnet for illegal immigrants
by establishing no fewer than 20 “sanctuary” cities or counties.

And the results of all this progressive policy? A poverty boom. California now has 12%
of the nation's population, but over 30% of its welfare recipients
. By the
official measure, based mainly on income and family size, California’s 11.4%
poverty rate in 2019 was close to the national average over the past three
years. However, according to a new Census Bureau report, which takes housing
and other costs into account, the real
poverty rate
in California is 17.2%,
the highest of any state
. (Newsom gets one thing right when he says, “We're
living in the wealthiest as well as the poorest state in America.”)

About a third of California’s poverty can be attributed to
housing and other living costs such as clothing and utilities. As everyone who
resides there knows, there’s a chronic housing shortage in the Bay Area (the
median-priced home in San Francisco costs about $1.5 million), mainly because a
plethora of regulations make the construction of affordable housing well-nigh
impossible. In blithe
disregard of all we know about rent
controls
— which discourage landlords from providing housing — that is,
predictably, the solution the Democrats propose.

But that’s not all. The state’s
public schools
rank 37th in the country overall and have the highest
pupil-teacher ratio
. “Only half of California students meet English
standards and fewer meet math standards, test scores show,” was a headline in the
Los Angeles Times last October. Health
care and pension costs are unsustainable.
Oh, and they messed up on
Covid-19, despite imposing the nation’s first shelter-in-place orders. Having
prematurely claimed victory, California now leads New York in terms of cases,
though not deaths.

Back in the 1960s, California was the world’s fantasy
destination. “California Dreamin’,” “California Girls,” “Going to California” —
you know the songs. But reputations have a way of outliving reality. Despite
the economic miracle wrought in Silicon Valley, beginning with the genesis of
the internet back in the 1970s, and despite the continuing strength of the
state’s universities
, the dream in
terms of quality of life has slowly died
.

When I first visited San
Francisco
in 1981, it was still one of the loveliest cities I had ever
beheld. Now its streets are so filthy — human feces and syringe needles
are the principal hazards — that I avoid it. (I was going to say “like the
plague,” but that’s Lake Tahoe.)

Yet the Bay Area and its southern sister Los Angeles are
only one of the two Californias. As Hanson argued 10 years ago, the Central Valley is another country,
more “Caribbean” or Latin American, where “countless inland communities … have
become near-apartheid societies, where Spanish is the first language, the schools are not
at all diverse, and the federal and state governments are either the main
employers or at least the chief sources of income.”

The principal reason for California’s decline is that the
Golden State became a one-party state. The Republican candidate won California
in every election but one (1964) between 1952 and 1988. But the Democrat has
won California in every election since, with the Democratic vote share rising
from 46% in 1992 to 62% in 2016.

One-Party State
Democrats' minority/majority in California Legislature*
Source: Michael J. Dubin/Party Affiliations in State
Legislatures

*Excludes independents

Democrats now have 61 out of 80 seats in the California State
Assembly. The last time Republicans had a majority (of one) was in 1994, but
that was an anomaly. The Democrats have
essentially controlled the State Senate since 1958,
with rising majorities
since the 1990s. Apart from 1994, the only other year since 1958 when they did
not win a majority of seats in the Assembly was 1968.

When regular voting has no effect, people eventually vote with their feet. From 2007 until
2016, about five million people moved to California but six million moved
out
to other states. For years before that, the newcomers were poorer than the leavers. This net exodus is surging
in 2020. And businesses (for example, Charles Schwab Corp.) are leaving too. Silicon Valley is going virtual, with
many big tech companies thinking of making work from home permanent for at
least some employees. (One tech chief executive told me last week that his engineers
were pleading not to return to the office
.)

People are getting out of the Bay Area as much and perhaps
more than they are getting out of New York City. Texas is only one of the
favored alternatives. Realtors in Montana
are reporting record demand from West Coast refugees. The hotels are full,
which is unheard of at this time of year. I also know a number of eminent
Californians who are now Hawaiians.

The conservative writer and broadcaster Ben Shapiro, born in
L.A., just announced that he is heading to Nashville, Tennessee. “I love the
state, grew up in the state, married in the state and have had children in the
state,” he told Laura Ingraham. But California was “not a great place to raise
children and not a great place to build a company.” Now we know the true
meaning of Calexit. It’s not
secession. It’s exodus
.

I cannot blame the leavers. When I moved West in 2016, it was in the naive belief that
California was Massachusetts without snow and Stanford was Harvard with
September weather all year round. How wrong I was.

But am I leaving? Well, maybe there’s no point. As Newsom’s
predecessor Jerry Brown put it last week: “There are going to be problems
everywhere in the United States. This is the new normal. It’s been predicted
and it’s happening … Tell me: Where are you going to go? What’s your
alternative?”

Great question, but — as with Newsom’s prophecy — wrongly
framed. The big problem is not that climate change is coming to every state. It
is, though most states will mitigate it better than California. The problem is that Democratic governance
could be coming to the nation as a whole
, starting on Jan. 20. And with the
Democratic nominee, Joe Biden, turning 78 two weeks after election day, it is
not a little troubling to me that his vice-presidential pick is a Californian,
just as so many of his plans to spend, tax and regulate have “designed in
California” all over them.

Yes, folks, California is America fast forward. Can someone
please hit pause?

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the
editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
Niall Ferguson at nferguson23@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net


There’s a housing bubble lurking in the recession - btbirkett@gmail.com - Gmail

There’s a housing bubble lurking in the recession - btbirkett@gmail.com - Gmail



Refi Madness

They say you shouldn’t fight the last war, but what about fighting the current war by planting the seeds of the next one, which may look a lot like the last one?
That sentence is about as confusing as this K-shaped recession has at times been, with GDP and employment collapsing but the values of stocks and houses soaring. Higher home prices along with record-low mortgage rates have helped ease the recession’s pain, giving borrowers lower monthly payments and a magical windfall of home equity to spend.
If this seems too good to be true, then Danielle DiMartino Booth warns it probably is. To grease the skids of the refi boom, lenders are increasingly doing away with pesky human appraisers, who tend to need “money” and “time,” relying instead on algorithms to spit out estimated home values. Increasingly those are overinflated, raising the risk of a painful reckoning for borrowers and banks when values sink to meet reality but loan balances don’t. And then the new war will look a lot like the old one.

Thursday, September 24, 2020

See how we’re reimagining dinosaurs in today’s ‘golden age’ of paleontology

See how we’re reimagining dinosaurs in today’s ‘golden age’ of paleontology

Harvard Economist Raj Chetty Creates God’s-Eye View of Pandemic Damage - Bloomberg

Harvard Economist Raj Chetty Creates God’s-Eye View of Pandemic Damage - Bloomberg





Harvard’s Chetty Finds Economic Carnage in Wealthiest ZIP
Codes
The celebrated economist has built a data tool with a
God’s-eye view of the pandemic’s damage—and soaring inequality.

By  September 24,
2020, 4:00 AM EDT

Raj Chetty hasn’t eaten at a restaurant in months. In fact,
he’s barely left his home near Harvard, where he’s an economics professor. The
MacArthur genius grant recipient has been getting his haircuts from a stem cell
biologist—his wife.

If you want to understand what’s really wrong with the
economy, this is a telling symptom: Chetty used to travel widely sharing
insights from his work, which mines data to paint a vividly detailed picture of
inequality in the U.S. Now he, like millions of other affluent Americans, is at
home. That might seem harmless—Chetty and his wife enjoy cooking together and
spending time with their 5-year-old daughter—until you confront the effects on
the already-precarious livelihoods of the people who fed, clothed, and
pampered this professional class
.

When Covid-19 hit, Chetty and his team of about 40
researchers and policy specialists dropped everything—including work on
inequality in housing, higher education, and longevity—to document the
pandemic’s lopsided impact. The result is a data tracker that gives a
day-by-day, state-by-state, and even neighborhood-by-neighborhood view of the
coronavirus economy. First uploaded in May and frequently expanded since, it
relies on nonpublic, proprietary data supplied by some of America’s largest
corporations to give a level of detail, in real time, that traditional economic
indicators can’t match.

The American Economic Association says Chetty is “arguably
the best applied microeconomist of his
generation.”

 Last month, a couple
days after former Vice President Joe Biden selected California Senator Kamala
Harris as his running mate, Chetty briefed the pair over video, presenting data
that demonstrated lower-income workers were bearing the brunt of the Covid
recession. His chart showed that by April, the bottom quarter of wage earners,
those making less than $27,000 a year, had lost almost 11 million jobs, more
than three times the number lost by the top quarter, which earn more than
$60,000 annually.

By late June the gap had widened further, even though many
businesses had reopened. In fact, the segment of Americans who are paid best
had recovered almost all the jobs lost since the start of the pandemic. “The recession has essentially ended for
high-income individuals,”
Chetty told Biden and Harris. Meanwhile, the
bottom half of American workers represented almost 80% of the jobs still
missing
.

Even as the better-off watched employment rebound and the
stock market surge, the virus’s economic devastation was all around them, in
shuttered restaurants, hair salons, and gyms. It was no longer possible to
ignore the economic chasms that separated people who used to live and work
alongside one another. “That creates this very local feel to the recession,”
Chetty says.

The mapping tool on his tracker allows you to visualize the
divergence as it’s played out in prosperous places from Manhattan’s Upper East
Side to San Francisco’s Pacific Heights. “The
shock is most severe actually in the richest parts of the country and the
richest neighborhoods
in the country,” he says. “It’s literally the people
you were interacting with who I think are suffering the most.”

Chetty has been described as “arguably the best applied
microeconomist of his generation” by the American Economic Association, which
awarded him the Clark Medal, often called the second-most prestigious prize in
the profession after the Nobel, in 2013. Like many of his contemporaries,
Chetty largely eschews theory and ideology in favor of data—the more the
better. His goal in diagnosing the source of the economic pain is to help find
ways to cure it. “It’s really done from the perspective of science,” says Heather
Boushey, a Biden adviser who heads the Washington Center for Equitable Growth.

Chetty and his team have been talking about their newest
project to any politician who will listen. On video calls with dozens of
Democrats and Republicans in Congress, as well as Treasury officials and state
and local policymakers, his message has been consistent: Get the virus under
control at all costs—a task the U.S. has so far failed at pitifully. No matter
how many businesses are allowed to reopen, normal economic life will not resume
until their customers feel they’re no longer at risk of contagion. In the
meantime, he tells them, target assistance to the people, businesses, and
places that need it. There’s no use
sending stimulus checks to people making $150,000 a year or cutting their
payroll taxes. They have plenty of money; what they lack is places to safely
spend it.

In the weeks before the U.S. government’s first jolt of
stimulus ran out, Chetty was optimistic that both parties in Washington seemed
to be getting the message. “I’ve consistently found an appreciation for what
the data have to say, even in these polarized times,” he said then. But with
infection rates spiking in a dozen states and Congress and the White House at
an impasse over what should take the place of the now lapsed $600-a-week
pandemic unemployment benefit and other assistance furnished through the Cares
Act
, Chetty has become alarmed by what his trove of data is telling him: The recovery has stalled.

Until recently, the Covid crisis of 2020 looked nothing like
the Great Recession of 2008—or any other slump. With American businesses and
workers held aloft by trillions of dollars in stimulus, the worst damage had
been limited to certain sectors and had even started to heal. Now the economy’s woes could metastasize,
taking down industries and workers that were untouched before.

All this threatens to make Chetty’s work much more
difficult. The American dream is dead, as he’d proved with exhaustive
government data showing today’s workers can no longer expect to earn more than
their parents did. Now those left behind by the economic changes of the past
few decades could be robbed of any remaining opportunities to get ahead.

One of Chetty’s most stunning findings was rendered in 2018
by the New York Times’ website in blue and yellow pixels that swarmed across
the screen. It’s beautiful, almost soothing, if you can forget you’re watching
a tragedy unfold. Each tiny square represents the life trajectory of one of
10,000 American men born into a family at the top 20% of the income spectrum.
They fall or rise based on the extent to which they were able to match their
parents’ comfortable incomes in adulthood. Those yellow pixels that keep bouncing
up at the top of the screen are White men in the sample. The blue ones that
keep tumbling to the bottom? They’re Black men.
The two-minute animation is
a simple, elegant illustration of the pernicious effects of racism on even the
most privileged Black Americans.

Many of Chetty’s slides and charts tell similarly grim
stories, even if the mild-mannered 41-year-old himself rarely shows much
emotion. “He presents the data in the most detached and remote way,” says Ford
Foundation President Darren Walker. Yet “he visualizes suffering in this
country in really profound ways. As a Black man, when I see that data, I am
emotionally disturbed and profoundly impacted.”

Chetty’s base of operations is Opportunity Insights, a venture based at Harvard that is part think
tank, part research lab. Started in 2018 with $36 million, including $15
million each from Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation, OI was co-founded by Chetty, Harvard colleague Nathaniel
Hendren, and Brown University professor John Friedman. Its mission, as spelled
out on its website, “is to identify barriers to economic opportunity and
develop scalable solutions that will empower people throughout the United
States to rise out of poverty and achieve better life outcomes.”

Translation: to improve economic
mobility
in the U.S.

The center’s staff includes more than a dozen recent college
graduates trained in the art of sifting through data, with some sets so large
they can take a computer a day or more to analyze. Chetty and his colleagues
don’t just identify problems, they suggest ways to fix them. A 2014 study
found that the best teachers can
help each student earn an additional $50,000 over their careers, which works
out to $1.4 million per homeroom. Chetty has suggested school districts hold on
to skilled teachers by tying pay or bonuses to performance.

Improving education for poor kids wouldn’t just help them
personally, Chetty’s research suggests. It should also boost the economy
overall. An analysis of the patents filed by 1.2 million Americans found
children of the top 1% are 10 times more likely to be inventors than equally
smart kids from other backgrounds. If talented women, minorities, and children
from low-income families could invent at the same rate as well-off White men,
Chetty and his co-authors estimated, these “lost Einsteins” could quadruple innovation in the U.S.

An “Opportunity Atlas” on the center’s website maps income
mobility across the U.S. down to the city, neighborhood, and even block. The
interactive tool, built using anonymized data from the Census Bureau and the
Internal Revenue Service, also pulls statistics on factors like teen-pregnancy,
incarceration rates, education levels, and commute times. The atlas, which went
live in 2018, revealed that moving a
child from a neighborhood with below-average mobility to one with above-average
mobility
could boost his or her lifetime earnings by about $200,000.

The project became the foundation for a Seattle-area
experiment in which families eligible for federal housing assistance received
relocation advice and support. U.S. Senator Todd Young, a Republican, has
co-sponsored a bipartisan bill to take the Seattle program nationwide. Back
home in Indiana, he borrows Chetty’s charts to explain the issue to rooms full
of constituents. Chetty “goes to great lengths to make his research accessible.
He’s not just speaking to other researchers,” Young says. “He’s presenting
information in plain language, in a visual format that one can understand
within seconds.”

Wealthy donors have also embraced Chetty’s research. When
he was lured back to Harvard two years ago from Stanford, billionaire hedge
fund manager Bill Ackman endowed a chair in the economics department for him.

Gates, Zuckerberg, and other donors (including Bloomberg LP founder Mike
Bloomberg) have given OI resources that few academic labs can match. The
center can hire not just research assistants to crunch data but also
experienced policy experts
who turn findings into advice for
decision-makers at all levels of government and web designers who create
ambitious data visualizations. “He created a new business model for how to do
economics,” says Princeton professor Markus Brunnermeier.

Even for Chetty, whose work has documented in damning detail
the many obstacles Black Americans face in this country, the murder of George
Floyd by Minneapolis police in May inspired a reaction of “horror about how
different people’s lives can be, given just the color of their skin,” he says.
Those differences are on full display on OI’s new tracker, which shows that as
their jobs have disappeared and their children’s educations stalled, minorities
and low-income Americans have been bearing a disproportionate burden from the
virus itself
. It also won’t help these groups that the disease is depriving
governments of tax revenue and putting extreme strains on nonprofits and
educational institutions. Many of the policies Chetty and his colleagues have
suggested to battle inequality, such as more inclusive college admissions and
housing desegregation, will require money to move forward. “All of this is
going to get tougher,” says Friedman, Chetty’s frequent collaborator.

Ford’s Walker is more optimistic. “For the first time in my
lifetime, we are reckoning with the issues of race and class in America,” he
says. “Americans have deluded ourselves for years that we are a meritocracy.”
Now they’re waking up to the often-insurmountable barriers to equal opportunity
Chetty has spent his career identifying. That makes him “the economist for this
moment of reckoning,” Walker says. “He understands that growing inequality
asphyxiates hope and makes it impossible
for people to dream and believe that their children will have better lives.”

When Covid-19 first reached the U.S., no one, Chetty
included, had much idea of what it was doing to the economy. Government
statistics like monthly unemployment numbers or the quarterly gross domestic
product series couldn’t keep up.

OI had started the year with a full plate of projects,
including Chetty’s most ambitious data effort yet: a collaboration with the
Census to document the economic trajectory of every American alive over the
past 70 years. Suddenly, most of the lab’s work ground to a halt as government
offices shut down.

With little else to keep their young researchers busy,
Chetty and his team started playing around with the few real-time measures of
the economy that were available. Homebase, a company that makes small-business
software, was offering researchers access to daily internal numbers, for
example.

During a meeting in early
April,
Chetty, Friedman, and others struck on an idea: What if they pulled
together data
from several private sources then put it all up on the
web,
so anyone could access it—an economic counterpart to Johns Hopkins University’s coronavirus
tracker
, which has become one of the go-to sources for health statistics.

“We didn’t realize just how big a project we were getting
ourselves into,” says Michael Stepner, a postdoctoral fellow at OI. At first,
he planned to devote 10 hours a week to the effort. But eventually it sucked in
the entire staff, with work progressing pretty much around the clock as night
owls overlapped with early birds. “This just took over the lab, and it took
over my life,” says Stepner, who will decamp for a teaching job at the
University of Toronto next year.

The team initially vetted a hodgepodge of data that might
show Covid’s effects on inequality, such as food pantry usage. Soon, though,
they focused on building only the most rigorous and comprehensive metrics.
Frequently cited as their inspiration
is Simon Kuznets, the Nobel Prize-winning economist who, in the depths of Great
Depression, developed ways to quantify gross domestic product and other
metrics. His pioneering work supplied the foundation for how the U.S. and
countries around the world measure their economies. Chetty set a similarly
ambitious goal for his project: “Bring economic measurement into the age of Big
Data.”

In today’s world, almost every economic transaction—a
debit-card swipe, a direct deposit from an employer, an electronic bill of
lading for a shipment of steel—has a
digital fingerprint
that’s captured and stored somewhere. Pull enough of
this data together and, in theory, you have a God’s-eye view of the econom
y.

Imagine how useful that could be during a recession like
this one. In place of the
one-size-fits-most policies in the Cares Act,
lawmakers would be able to
target stimulus with precision to the industries and sectors of the population
that need it most and get nearly instantaneous feedback on whether it’s
working. And of course there are applications beyond this pandemic. Using the
tracker, a state hit by a natural disaster could pinpoint which communities
were lagging in the recovery. A city trying to revive its downtown could get a
rapid read on retail spending.

Using private data to study economics isn’t a new idea, but
the Covid crisis gave Chetty the confidence that he might be able to pull off
something unprecedented. OI’s major donors were enthusiastic. “We see it as
something that has a great deal of potential for the future, well beyond the
current crisis,” says Ryan Rippel, who oversees the Gates Foundation’s work
on economic mobility and opportunity
.

The first hurdle was persuading companies to part with as
precious a possession as their internal data. “Normally I wouldn’t have thought
of approaching big companies like Intuit or Mastercard,” Chetty says, but the
virus made them much more willing to help. “If we can figure out how to revive
the economy, obviously that’s good for everyone.”

Chetty’s reputation, and his years of experience in handling
supersecret government records, reassured providers their data would be
properly aggregated, anonymized, and blended with other sets in ways that fully protected privacy. “Raj’s group
is pretty advanced,” says Ram Palaniappan, chief executive officer of Earnin,
which makes a financial app that’s supplying information on wages of
lower-income workers.

Ensuring that the individual streams of data could be pooled
to render an accurate picture of the larger economy was its own challenge. “The
main issue when you get data from these private companies is that you’re
learning something about their business and not something about the economy as
a whole,” says Friedman, a co-director of the center. Some sources, a
debit-card issuer, for example, were rejected as unrepresentative. “Sometimes
it worked and sometimes it didn’t, and we tried to be creative about how to
fill in the holes we needed.”

In May, after a
five-week marathon, OI launched the
tracker
, and the world got to see how jobs, spending, small business
revenue, and other metrics responded to the onset of the pandemic in the U.S.
Other academics started poring through the rich data sets, freely available for
download, to study everything from inflation to partisanship. States and local
governments started consulting the tracker to see which industries needed help.
“We literally use it every single day,” says Rob Dixon, director of the
Missouri Department of Economic Development.

On the tracker, you can see that back in March, when the
lockdowns started, almost every household in America was reeling, with overall
consumer spending plunging 33%. Then, around April 15, spending surges, with
bigger jumps in low-income neighborhoods: That’s the first round of stimulus
payments landing in people’s wallets. As jobless benefits kick in, including
the $600 per week pandemic top-up that left many workers with more than they
were earning before, spending kept rising. By late June, residents of
low-income neighborhoods were spending a bit more than they had before the
crisis.

Displayed on a map, though, the tracker data revealed some
troubling patterns. In March and April, small businesses in affluent big-city neighborhoods saw their
revenue drop 70%—more than twice the decline in the least affluent areas.
Saddled with high rents, many of these shops, restaurants, and bars shut their
doors for good.

Because high-income Americans make up such a large share of
overall spending, the effects of their caution lingered even as cities and
states allowed businesses to reopen. Using the tracker, you can compare
neighboring states that reopened at different times, such as Colorado on May 1
and New Mexico on May 16, and see there’s almost no difference in employment or
consumer spending trajectories.

Chetty grew even more alarmed as the summer wore on. His conversations
with senators about the best ways to do another round of stimulus hadn’t borne
fruit, with congressional Democrats insisting the economy needs far more
support than Trump and Republicans have proposed. In early August, unemployed Americans stopped getting their extra $600
a week. The tracker didn’t show activity plummeting right away, as Chetty
worried it might. Instead, measures like spending and small business revenue
flatlined. “We’re basically stalled,” he says.

After the tracker’s debut, OI continued to sign up companies
willing to share their data (there are 11 in total now). What emerged was an
even clearer picture of the gaps opening between the most privileged Americans
and everyone else. In August, payroll provider Paychex offered data that,
combined with info from Intuit, Earnin, and Kronos, revealed that high-income
workers had regained almost all the jobs lost in March and April. (The findings
Chetty shared with Biden and Harris.) That “all the more heightens the need for targeted unemployment benefits,” he says.

The virus’s spread, and the lack of a national strategy to
fight it, hobbled the economy in ways Chetty hadn’t expected. After cases and
deaths rose in places such as Florida and Arizona, key indicators like consumer
spending and small business revenue dipped but didn’t plunge.

Why? Chetty’s working theory is that Sun Belt states’
economic resilience might be a sign that they’re not taking the disease
seriously enough to get it under control. Trying to keep the economy humming
while the virus runs rampant is a “short-term-ist perspective” with long-term
costs, he says.

A
scenario in which Covid is never corralled the way it has been in some
countries in Europe and Asia haunts Chetty.
“It’s not going to be a
sustained recovery. There’s just no way,” he says. “We’re going to be stuck trying to go along and
accept a fair number of Covid infections and deaths and muddle our way through
until finally there’s a vaccine.

This would be especially damaging for disadvantaged groups, children
in particular. If schools can’t reopen safely for in-person learning,
low-income kids will fall even further behind their peers. The tracker includes
one bit of noneconomic data, from Zearn Inc., a nonprofit online math platform,
showing overall usage dropped when schools closed in March. Then, however, kids
in high-income areas, prodded by well-educated parents who were working from
home, started logging on again, completing more lessons in early May than they
had before the crisis. By contrast, overall participation on Zearn had dropped
almost 30%, and by more than half for children in low-income areas, possibly
because they were in households where parents were more likely to be
“essential” employees working outside the home. “Public schools were, to some
extent, serving to level the playing field and increase social mobility,”
Chetty says. With the shift to mostly or only remote learning in many school
districts, “you’re going to have massive impacts on inequality.”

Chetty doesn’t pretend to have simple solutions to the Covid
recession, or to America’s worsening inequality gap. What he has to offer are
smaller but often easier-to-implement fixes, like the program in Seattle.
Because of his scientific bent, he likes to see policies tested in one particular locale before they’re rolled out
more widely. “A lot of the solutions that are going to have the greatest
impacts are going to be locally led and community created,” says Rippel of the
Gates Foundation.

Unlike some high-profile economists who have strongly
partisan viewpoints, Chetty doesn’t ask elected leaders or their voters to
abandon their political ideologies. He just tries to get them to pay attention
to the people and places the economy has shunted aside. We’ll only see their
suffering if we obsess less about aggregate measures like GDP, and more about
what’s happening on street corners and in schoolyards where Americans are
blocked from reaching their potential.

To figure out how to restore opportunity for the
disadvantaged, Chetty will need lots more data. So he’s still on the hunt for
fresh inputs for his tracker: better ways to measure cash transactions,
health-care spending, housing costs, and the balance sheets of businesses and
households. The more data you have, the more “it brings to light the
interconnected nature of the economy,” he says.

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