Xi Jinping Could Make
the Same Mistakes as Kaiser Wilhelm II
the Same Mistakes as Kaiser Wilhelm II
U.S.-China tensions look eerily like the rivalry between
Britain and Germany before World War I. Let’s hope it doesn’t end the same way.
Britain and Germany before World War I. Let’s hope it doesn’t end the same way.
By Andreas Kluth
July 29, 2020, 5:00 AM GMT+1
Andreas Kluth is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He was
previously editor in chief of Handelsblatt Global and a writer for the
Economist. He's the author of "Hannibal and Me."
previously editor in chief of Handelsblatt Global and a writer for the
Economist. He's the author of "Hannibal and Me."
Animosity between China and the U.S. was already bad when
the year started, and it just keeps getting worse. Whether the two powers are
hurling accusations over Covid-19, shutting each other’s consulates, rattling
sabers in the South China Sea, escalating their trade war, or simply vilifying
each other in speeches, they appear headed for ever more bitter clashes.
the year started, and it just keeps getting worse. Whether the two powers are
hurling accusations over Covid-19, shutting each other’s consulates, rattling
sabers in the South China Sea, escalating their trade war, or simply vilifying
each other in speeches, they appear headed for ever more bitter clashes.
Some say this is a
new Cold War. But that label doesn’t quite fit, because nothing about the
standoff seems frozen, and the rest of the world is not (or not yet) split into
opposing camps. This is a different kind of rivalry — one that will touch every
aspect of global politics, economics, technology and finance as it heats up,
and could one day end in a hot war.
new Cold War. But that label doesn’t quite fit, because nothing about the
standoff seems frozen, and the rest of the world is not (or not yet) split into
opposing camps. This is a different kind of rivalry — one that will touch every
aspect of global politics, economics, technology and finance as it heats up,
and could one day end in a hot war.
Scholars call this kind of conflict spiral a “Thucydides trap.” It’s the apparent
tendency, throughout history, toward war whenever a rising nation challenges
an incumbent power. The label comes from the ancient Greek historian who so
perceptively chronicled the complex Peloponnesian War, which he believed was
ultimately caused by the rise of Athens and the fear this provoked in Sparta.
tendency, throughout history, toward war whenever a rising nation challenges
an incumbent power. The label comes from the ancient Greek historian who so
perceptively chronicled the complex Peloponnesian War, which he believed was
ultimately caused by the rise of Athens and the fear this provoked in Sparta.
But in the case of the U.S. and China, there’s a much better
analogy, as these historians and economists have described. It is the struggle
between the British Empire and the
up-and-coming German Empire after its unification in 1871.
analogy, as these historians and economists have described. It is the struggle
between the British Empire and the
up-and-coming German Empire after its unification in 1871.
That era, like ours, was one of industrial and
technological revolution and uneasy globalization. Like the U.S., Britain
was a democracy that largely believed in free markets. And as the U.S. has done
since World War II — at least, until the presidency of Donald Trump — the U.K.
chaperoned an international order regulating trade and finance, overseeing the
so-called Pax Britannica.
technological revolution and uneasy globalization. Like the U.S., Britain
was a democracy that largely believed in free markets. And as the U.S. has done
since World War II — at least, until the presidency of Donald Trump — the U.K.
chaperoned an international order regulating trade and finance, overseeing the
so-called Pax Britannica.
On the opposing side, resembling China today, was Germany,
an autocratic state that held a grudge for being late to industrialize
and was bent on overtaking the leader, with state-directed and nationalist
economic policies. Also like China today, Germany did this in part by
pilfering patents and technologies, and aggressively pushing alternatives
to its rival’s standards.
an autocratic state that held a grudge for being late to industrialize
and was bent on overtaking the leader, with state-directed and nationalist
economic policies. Also like China today, Germany did this in part by
pilfering patents and technologies, and aggressively pushing alternatives
to its rival’s standards.
One race back then, for example, was for the dominant
standard in radio communications.
The Brits used and backed the technology pioneered by the Italian inventor
Guglielmo Marconi. The Germans, at
the behest of Kaiser Wilhelm II, did everything to develop and spread their own
standard, from a company called Telefunken,
which Britain resisted at every turn but was unable to squelch. The
analogue today would be 5G telecoms networks, and America’s global campaign to
exclude the main Chinese supplier, Huawei Technologies Co.
standard in radio communications.
The Brits used and backed the technology pioneered by the Italian inventor
Guglielmo Marconi. The Germans, at
the behest of Kaiser Wilhelm II, did everything to develop and spread their own
standard, from a company called Telefunken,
which Britain resisted at every turn but was unable to squelch. The
analogue today would be 5G telecoms networks, and America’s global campaign to
exclude the main Chinese supplier, Huawei Technologies Co.
In both eras, the challenger feared being geographically
encircled and sought to break out with huge and geopolitically motivated
infrastructure projects. Germany, looking east, tried to build the Berlin-Baghdad railway for access to
the Indian Ocean that bypassed the British navy. China, looking west, has the
Belt and Road Initiative, a plan to link ports, sea lanes, rail lines and
information systems across Eurasia and Africa. Germany’s project was halted by
World War I; China’s is running into opposition from some countries along the
route.
encircled and sought to break out with huge and geopolitically motivated
infrastructure projects. Germany, looking east, tried to build the Berlin-Baghdad railway for access to
the Indian Ocean that bypassed the British navy. China, looking west, has the
Belt and Road Initiative, a plan to link ports, sea lanes, rail lines and
information systems across Eurasia and Africa. Germany’s project was halted by
World War I; China’s is running into opposition from some countries along the
route.
These rivalries initially escalated without causing military
conflict. The U.K. then, like the U.S. now, levied punitive tariffs that
achieved little, and tried other things short of shooting. Diplomatically, it
helped that Germany in the 19th century and China more recently at first
had leaders sophisticated enough to make their own countries stronger
without risking an all-out conflagration.
conflict. The U.K. then, like the U.S. now, levied punitive tariffs that
achieved little, and tried other things short of shooting. Diplomatically, it
helped that Germany in the 19th century and China more recently at first
had leaders sophisticated enough to make their own countries stronger
without risking an all-out conflagration.
In the first case, this was Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who masterminded Germany’s
rise under two Kaisers until he was fired by the third, Wilhelm II, a vain and insecure character who felt as threatened
by “experts” as Trump does today. Bismarck’s analogue in China was Deng
Xiaoping, who as “paramount leader” oversaw China’s industrialization, but
without openly antagonizing the Americans. Under one of his successors, Hu
Jintao, this policy of avoiding the Thucydides trap — and specifically the
Anglo-German precedent which Beijing had studied in depth — became official
doctrine under the label “peaceful rise.”
rise under two Kaisers until he was fired by the third, Wilhelm II, a vain and insecure character who felt as threatened
by “experts” as Trump does today. Bismarck’s analogue in China was Deng
Xiaoping, who as “paramount leader” oversaw China’s industrialization, but
without openly antagonizing the Americans. Under one of his successors, Hu
Jintao, this policy of avoiding the Thucydides trap — and specifically the
Anglo-German precedent which Beijing had studied in depth — became official
doctrine under the label “peaceful rise.”
But eventually the zeitgeist changed. Wilhelm II, a cousin
of King George V, on one hand admired and envied everything English and on the
other projected a crude and jingoistic militarism, changing uniforms several
times a day. Chinese President Xi Jinping esteems the U.S. enough to send his
daughter (under a pseudonym) to get a degree from Harvard University. But his
foreign policy is known as “wolf warrior diplomacy,” after a buffoonish
film about Chinese studs kicking Western butts.
of King George V, on one hand admired and envied everything English and on the
other projected a crude and jingoistic militarism, changing uniforms several
times a day. Chinese President Xi Jinping esteems the U.S. enough to send his
daughter (under a pseudonym) to get a degree from Harvard University. But his
foreign policy is known as “wolf warrior diplomacy,” after a buffoonish
film about Chinese studs kicking Western butts.
Trump, who is
Wilhelmine in his narcissism and strategic myopia, has certainly
made the situation worse. But even a victory by Joe Biden in November may not
suffice to alter the fundamental dynamic of the Thucydides trap. As Germany
under Wilhelm II bullied, postured and provoked, China under Xi is cracking
down ever harder on Hong Kong and the Uighurs in Xinjiang, clashing with
neighbors from the Himalayas to the South China Sea, and menacing Taiwan.
Wilhelmine in his narcissism and strategic myopia, has certainly
made the situation worse. But even a victory by Joe Biden in November may not
suffice to alter the fundamental dynamic of the Thucydides trap. As Germany
under Wilhelm II bullied, postured and provoked, China under Xi is cracking
down ever harder on Hong Kong and the Uighurs in Xinjiang, clashing with
neighbors from the Himalayas to the South China Sea, and menacing Taiwan.
History, of course, is not doomed to repeat. And yet, people
in Beijing, Washington and other capitals would do well to reread it, lest our
generation also “sleepwalk” into a world war. By 1914, as today, the international system had become too complex
for the antagonists to grasp. And then a fuse was lit in Bosnia, a place
many Germans and Brits couldn’t have found on a map. In our time, it may happen
on the log of a computer that’s been hacked by an enemy, or on an uninhabited
rock in the South China Sea.
in Beijing, Washington and other capitals would do well to reread it, lest our
generation also “sleepwalk” into a world war. By 1914, as today, the international system had become too complex
for the antagonists to grasp. And then a fuse was lit in Bosnia, a place
many Germans and Brits couldn’t have found on a map. In our time, it may happen
on the log of a computer that’s been hacked by an enemy, or on an uninhabited
rock in the South China Sea.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the
editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To contact the author of this story:
Andreas Kluth at akluth1@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
James Boxell at jboxell@bloomberg.net
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