...
"The
Dark Forest," which continues the story of the invasion of Earth by the
ruthless and technologically superior Trisolarans, introduces Liu’s three
axioms of “cosmic sociology.”
Dark Forest," which continues the story of the invasion of Earth by the
ruthless and technologically superior Trisolarans, introduces Liu’s three
axioms of “cosmic sociology.”
First, “Survival is the primary need of civilization.”
Second, “Civilization continuously grows and expands, but the total matter in
the universe remains constant.” Third, “chains of suspicion” and the risk of a
“technological explosion” in another civilization mean that in space there can only be the law of the jungle.
In the words of the book’s hero, Luo Ji:
Second, “Civilization continuously grows and expands, but the total matter in
the universe remains constant.” Third, “chains of suspicion” and the risk of a
“technological explosion” in another civilization mean that in space there can only be the law of the jungle.
In the words of the book’s hero, Luo Ji:
The
universe is a dark forest. Every civilization is an armed hunter stalking
through the trees like a ghost … trying to tread without sound … The hunter has
to be careful, because everywhere in the forest are stealthy hunters like him.
If he finds other life — another hunter, an angel or a demon, a delicate infant
or a tottering old man, a fairy or a demigod — there’s only one thing he can
do: open fire and eliminate them. In this forest, hell is other people … any
life that exposes its own existence will be swiftly wiped out.
universe is a dark forest. Every civilization is an armed hunter stalking
through the trees like a ghost … trying to tread without sound … The hunter has
to be careful, because everywhere in the forest are stealthy hunters like him.
If he finds other life — another hunter, an angel or a demon, a delicate infant
or a tottering old man, a fairy or a demigod — there’s only one thing he can
do: open fire and eliminate them. In this forest, hell is other people … any
life that exposes its own existence will be swiftly wiped out.
Kissinger is often thought of (in my view, wrongly) as the
supreme American exponent of Realpolitik. But this is something much harsher
than realism. This is intergalactic
Darwinism.
supreme American exponent of Realpolitik. But this is something much harsher
than realism. This is intergalactic
Darwinism.
whole article:
America and China Are
Entering the Dark Forest
Entering the Dark Forest
To know what the Chinese are really up to, read the
futuristic novels of Liu Cixin.
futuristic novels of Liu Cixin.
By Niall Ferguson
July 5, 2020, 1:00 PM GMT+1
Niall Ferguson is the Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He
was previously a professor of history at Harvard, New York University and
Oxford. He is the founder and managing director of Greenmantle LLC, a New
York-based advisory firm.
Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He
was previously a professor of history at Harvard, New York University and
Oxford. He is the founder and managing director of Greenmantle LLC, a New
York-based advisory firm.
“We are in the
foothills of a Cold War.” Those were the words of Henry Kissinger when I
interviewed him at the Bloomberg New Economy Forum in Beijing last November.
foothills of a Cold War.” Those were the words of Henry Kissinger when I
interviewed him at the Bloomberg New Economy Forum in Beijing last November.
The observation in itself was not wholly startling. It had
seemed obvious to me since early last year that a new Cold War — between the
U.S. and China — had begun. This insight wasn’t just based on interviews with
elder statesmen. Counterintuitive as it may seem, I had picked up the idea from
binge-reading Chinese science fiction.
seemed obvious to me since early last year that a new Cold War — between the
U.S. and China — had begun. This insight wasn’t just based on interviews with
elder statesmen. Counterintuitive as it may seem, I had picked up the idea from
binge-reading Chinese science fiction.
First, the history. What had started out in early 2018 as a
trade war over tariffs and intellectual property theft had by the end of the
year metamorphosed into a technology war over the global dominance of the
Chinese company Huawei Technologies Co. in 5G network telecommunications; an
ideological confrontation in response to Beijing’s treatment of the Uighur
minority in China’s Xinjiang region and the pro-democracy protesters in Hong
Kong; and an escalation of old frictions over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
trade war over tariffs and intellectual property theft had by the end of the
year metamorphosed into a technology war over the global dominance of the
Chinese company Huawei Technologies Co. in 5G network telecommunications; an
ideological confrontation in response to Beijing’s treatment of the Uighur
minority in China’s Xinjiang region and the pro-democracy protesters in Hong
Kong; and an escalation of old frictions over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Nevertheless, for Kissinger, of all people, to acknowledge
that we were in the opening phase of Cold War II was remarkable.
that we were in the opening phase of Cold War II was remarkable.
Since his first secret visit to Beijing in 1971,
Kissinger has been the master-builder of that policy of U.S.-Chinese engagement
which, for 45 years, was a leitmotif of U.S. foreign policy. It
fundamentally altered the balance of power at the mid-point of the Cold War, to
the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. It created the geopolitical conditions
for China’s industrial revolution, the
biggest and fastest in history. And it led, after China’s accession to the
World Trade Organization, to that extraordinary financial symbiosis which
Moritz Schularick and I christened “Chimerica” in 2007.
Kissinger has been the master-builder of that policy of U.S.-Chinese engagement
which, for 45 years, was a leitmotif of U.S. foreign policy. It
fundamentally altered the balance of power at the mid-point of the Cold War, to
the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. It created the geopolitical conditions
for China’s industrial revolution, the
biggest and fastest in history. And it led, after China’s accession to the
World Trade Organization, to that extraordinary financial symbiosis which
Moritz Schularick and I christened “Chimerica” in 2007.
How did relations between Beijing and Washington sour so
quickly that even Kissinger now speaks of Cold War?
quickly that even Kissinger now speaks of Cold War?
The conventional answer to that question is that President
Donald Trump has swung like a wrecking ball into the “liberal international
order” and that Cold War II is only one of the adverse consequences of his
“America First” strategy.
Donald Trump has swung like a wrecking ball into the “liberal international
order” and that Cold War II is only one of the adverse consequences of his
“America First” strategy.
Yet that view attaches too much importance to the change in
U.S. foreign policy since 2016, and not enough to the change in Chinese foreign policy that came four years earlier, when
Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Future
historians will discern that the decline and fall of Chimerica began in the
wake of the global financial crisis, as a new Chinese leader drew the
conclusion that there was no longer any need to hide the light of China’s
ambition under the bushel that Deng Xiaoping had famously recommended.
U.S. foreign policy since 2016, and not enough to the change in Chinese foreign policy that came four years earlier, when
Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Future
historians will discern that the decline and fall of Chimerica began in the
wake of the global financial crisis, as a new Chinese leader drew the
conclusion that there was no longer any need to hide the light of China’s
ambition under the bushel that Deng Xiaoping had famously recommended.
When Middle America voted for Trump four years ago, it was
partly a backlash against the asymmetric payoffs of engagement and its economic
corollary, globalization. Not only had the economic benefits of Chimerica gone
disproportionately to China, not only had its costs been borne
disproportionately by working-class Americans, but now those same Americans saw
that their elected leaders in Washington had acted as midwives at the birth of
a new strategic superpower — a challenger for global predominance even more
formidable, because economically stronger, than the Soviet Union.
partly a backlash against the asymmetric payoffs of engagement and its economic
corollary, globalization. Not only had the economic benefits of Chimerica gone
disproportionately to China, not only had its costs been borne
disproportionately by working-class Americans, but now those same Americans saw
that their elected leaders in Washington had acted as midwives at the birth of
a new strategic superpower — a challenger for global predominance even more
formidable, because economically stronger, than the Soviet Union.
It is not only Kissinger who recognizes that the
relationship with Beijing has soured. Orville Schell, another long-time
believer in engagement, recently conceded that the approach had foundered
“because of the CCP’s deep ambivalence about the way engaging in a truly
meaningful way might lead to demands for more reform and change and its
ultimate demise.”
relationship with Beijing has soured. Orville Schell, another long-time
believer in engagement, recently conceded that the approach had foundered
“because of the CCP’s deep ambivalence about the way engaging in a truly
meaningful way might lead to demands for more reform and change and its
ultimate demise.”
Conservative critics of engagement, meanwhile, are eager to
dance on its grave, urging that the People’s Republic be economically “quarantined,” its role in global supply chains
drastically reduced. There is a spring in the step of the more Sinophobic
members of the Trump administration, notably Secretary of State Mike Pompeo,
deputy National Security Adviser Matt Pottinger and trade adviser Peter
Navarro. For the past three and a half years they have been arguing that the single
most important thing about Trump's presidency was that he had changed the
course of U.S. policy towards China, a shift from engagement to competition
spelled out in the 2017 National Security Strategy. The events of 2020 would
seem to have vindicated them.
dance on its grave, urging that the People’s Republic be economically “quarantined,” its role in global supply chains
drastically reduced. There is a spring in the step of the more Sinophobic
members of the Trump administration, notably Secretary of State Mike Pompeo,
deputy National Security Adviser Matt Pottinger and trade adviser Peter
Navarro. For the past three and a half years they have been arguing that the single
most important thing about Trump's presidency was that he had changed the
course of U.S. policy towards China, a shift from engagement to competition
spelled out in the 2017 National Security Strategy. The events of 2020 would
seem to have vindicated them.
The Covid-19 pandemic has done more than intensify Cold War
II. It has revealed its existence to those who last year doubted it. The
Chinese Communist Party caused this disaster — first by covering up how
dangerous the new virus SARS-CoV-2 was, then by delaying the measures that
might have prevented its worldwide spread.
II. It has revealed its existence to those who last year doubted it. The
Chinese Communist Party caused this disaster — first by covering up how
dangerous the new virus SARS-CoV-2 was, then by delaying the measures that
might have prevented its worldwide spread.
Yet now China wants to claim the credit for saving the world
from the crisis it caused. Liberally exporting cheap and not wholly reliable ventilators, testing kits and face
masks, the Chinese government has sought to snatch victory from the jaws of a
defeat it inflicted. The deputy director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s
information department has gone so far as to endorse a conspiracy theory that
the coronavirus originated in the U.S. and retweet an article claiming that an
American team had brought the virus with them when they participated in the
World Military Games in Wuhan last October.
from the crisis it caused. Liberally exporting cheap and not wholly reliable ventilators, testing kits and face
masks, the Chinese government has sought to snatch victory from the jaws of a
defeat it inflicted. The deputy director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s
information department has gone so far as to endorse a conspiracy theory that
the coronavirus originated in the U.S. and retweet an article claiming that an
American team had brought the virus with them when they participated in the
World Military Games in Wuhan last October.
Just as implausible are Chinese claims that the U.S. is
somehow behind the recurrent waves of pro-democracy protest in Hong Kong. The
current confrontation over the former British colony’s status is unambiguously
Made in China. As Pompeo has said, the new National Security Law Beijing
imposed on Hong Kong last Tuesday effectively “destroys” the territory’s
semi-autonomy and tears up the 1984 Sino-British joint declaration, which
guaranteed that Hong Kong would retain its own legal system for 50 years after its
handover to People’s Republic in 1997.
somehow behind the recurrent waves of pro-democracy protest in Hong Kong. The
current confrontation over the former British colony’s status is unambiguously
Made in China. As Pompeo has said, the new National Security Law Beijing
imposed on Hong Kong last Tuesday effectively “destroys” the territory’s
semi-autonomy and tears up the 1984 Sino-British joint declaration, which
guaranteed that Hong Kong would retain its own legal system for 50 years after its
handover to People’s Republic in 1997.
In this context, it is not really surprising that American
public sentiment towards China has become markedly more hawkish since 2017,
especially among older voters. China is one of few subjects these days about which
there is a genuine bipartisan consensus.
It is a sign of the times that Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden’s
campaign clearly intends to portray their man as more hawkish on China than
Trump. (Former National Security Adviser John Bolton’s new memoir is grist to
their mill.) On Hong Kong, Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic speaker of the House,
is every bit as indignant as Pompeo.
public sentiment towards China has become markedly more hawkish since 2017,
especially among older voters. China is one of few subjects these days about which
there is a genuine bipartisan consensus.
It is a sign of the times that Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden’s
campaign clearly intends to portray their man as more hawkish on China than
Trump. (Former National Security Adviser John Bolton’s new memoir is grist to
their mill.) On Hong Kong, Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic speaker of the House,
is every bit as indignant as Pompeo.
I have argued that this new Cold War is both inevitable and
desirable, not least because it has jolted
the U.S. out of complacency and into an earnest effort not to be surpassed
by China in artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other
strategically crucial technologies. Yet there remains, in academia
especially, significant resistance to my view that we should stop worrying and learn to love Cold
War II.
desirable, not least because it has jolted
the U.S. out of complacency and into an earnest effort not to be surpassed
by China in artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other
strategically crucial technologies. Yet there remains, in academia
especially, significant resistance to my view that we should stop worrying and learn to love Cold
War II.
At a forum last week on World Order after Covid-19,
organized by the Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins
University, a clear majority of speakers warned of the perils of a new Cold
War.
organized by the Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins
University, a clear majority of speakers warned of the perils of a new Cold
War.
Eric Schmidt, the former chairman of Google, argued instead
for a “rivalry-partnership” model of “coop-etition,” in which the two nations
would at once compete and cooperate in the way that Samsung and Apple have
done for years.
for a “rivalry-partnership” model of “coop-etition,” in which the two nations
would at once compete and cooperate in the way that Samsung and Apple have
done for years.
Harvard’s Graham Allison, the author of the bestselling
"Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?",
agreed, giving as another example the 11th-century “frenmity” between the Song
Emperor of China and the Liao kingdom on China’s northern border. The pandemic,
Allison argued, has made “incandescent the impossibility of identifying China
clearly as either foe or friend. Rivalry-partnership
may sound complicated, but life is complicated.”
"Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?",
agreed, giving as another example the 11th-century “frenmity” between the Song
Emperor of China and the Liao kingdom on China’s northern border. The pandemic,
Allison argued, has made “incandescent the impossibility of identifying China
clearly as either foe or friend. Rivalry-partnership
may sound complicated, but life is complicated.”
“The establishment of a productive and predictable US/China
relationship,” wrote John Lipsky, formerly of the International Monetary Fund,
“is a sine qua non for strengthening the institutions of global governance.”
The last Cold War had cast a “shadow of a global holocaust for decades,”
observed James Steinberg, a former deputy secretary of state. “What can be done
to create a context to limit the rivalry and create space for cooperation?”
relationship,” wrote John Lipsky, formerly of the International Monetary Fund,
“is a sine qua non for strengthening the institutions of global governance.”
The last Cold War had cast a “shadow of a global holocaust for decades,”
observed James Steinberg, a former deputy secretary of state. “What can be done
to create a context to limit the rivalry and create space for cooperation?”
Elizabeth Economy, my colleague at the Hoover Institution,
had an answer: “The United States and China could … partner to address a global
challenge,” namely climate change. Tom Wright of the Brookings Institution took
a similar line: “Focusing only on great power competition while ignoring the
need for cooperation will not actually give the United States an enduring
strategic advantage over China.”
had an answer: “The United States and China could … partner to address a global
challenge,” namely climate change. Tom Wright of the Brookings Institution took
a similar line: “Focusing only on great power competition while ignoring the
need for cooperation will not actually give the United States an enduring
strategic advantage over China.”
All this sounds eminently reasonable, apart from one thing.
The Chinese Communist Party isn’t Samsung, much less the Liao kingdom. Rather —
as was true in Cold War I, when (especially after 1968) academics tended to be
doves rather than hawks — today’s proponents of “rivalry-partnership” are
overlooking the possibility that the Chinese aren’t interested in being
frenemies. They know full well this is a
Cold War, because they started it.
The Chinese Communist Party isn’t Samsung, much less the Liao kingdom. Rather —
as was true in Cold War I, when (especially after 1968) academics tended to be
doves rather than hawks — today’s proponents of “rivalry-partnership” are
overlooking the possibility that the Chinese aren’t interested in being
frenemies. They know full well this is a
Cold War, because they started it.
To be sure, there are also Chinese scholars who lament the
passing of engagement. The economist Yu Yongding recently joined Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University to argue for reconciliation between Washington
and Beijing. Yet that is no longer the official view in Beijing. When I first
began talking publicly about Cold War II at conferences last year, I was
surprised that no Chinese delegates contradicted me. In September, I asked one
of them — the Chinese head of a major international institution — why that was.
“Because I agree with you!” he replied with a smile.
passing of engagement. The economist Yu Yongding recently joined Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University to argue for reconciliation between Washington
and Beijing. Yet that is no longer the official view in Beijing. When I first
began talking publicly about Cold War II at conferences last year, I was
surprised that no Chinese delegates contradicted me. In September, I asked one
of them — the Chinese head of a major international institution — why that was.
“Because I agree with you!” he replied with a smile.
As a visiting professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, I
have seen for myself the ideological turning of the tide under Xi. Academics
who study taboo subjects such as the Cultural Revolution find themselves
subject to investigations or worse. Those who take a more combative stance
toward the West get promoted.
have seen for myself the ideological turning of the tide under Xi. Academics
who study taboo subjects such as the Cultural Revolution find themselves
subject to investigations or worse. Those who take a more combative stance
toward the West get promoted.
Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International
Relations at Tsinghua, recently argued that Cold War II, unlike Cold War I,
will be a purely technological competition, without proxy wars and nuclear brinkmanship.
Yao Yang, dean of the National School of Development at Peking University, was
equally candid in an interview with the Beijing Cultural Review, published on
April 28.
Relations at Tsinghua, recently argued that Cold War II, unlike Cold War I,
will be a purely technological competition, without proxy wars and nuclear brinkmanship.
Yao Yang, dean of the National School of Development at Peking University, was
equally candid in an interview with the Beijing Cultural Review, published on
April 28.
“To a certain degree we already find ourselves in the
situation of a New Cold War," he said. “There are two basic reasons for
this. The first is the need for Western politicians to play the blame game”
about the origins of the pandemic. “The next thing," he added, "is
that now Westerners want to make this into a ‘systems’ question, saying that
the reason that China could carry out such drastic control measures [in Hubei
province] is because China is not a democratic society, and this is where the
power and capacity to do this came from.”
situation of a New Cold War," he said. “There are two basic reasons for
this. The first is the need for Western politicians to play the blame game”
about the origins of the pandemic. “The next thing," he added, "is
that now Westerners want to make this into a ‘systems’ question, saying that
the reason that China could carry out such drastic control measures [in Hubei
province] is because China is not a democratic society, and this is where the
power and capacity to do this came from.”
This, however, is weak beer compared with the hard stuff
regularly served up on Twitter by the pack
leader of the “wolf warrior” diplomats, Zhao Lijian. “The Hong Kong
Autonomy Act passed by the US Senate is nothing but a piece of scrap paper,” he
tweeted on Monday, in response to the congressional retaliation against
China’s new Hong Kong security law. By
his standards, this was understatement.
regularly served up on Twitter by the pack
leader of the “wolf warrior” diplomats, Zhao Lijian. “The Hong Kong
Autonomy Act passed by the US Senate is nothing but a piece of scrap paper,” he
tweeted on Monday, in response to the congressional retaliation against
China’s new Hong Kong security law. By
his standards, this was understatement.
The tone of the official Chinese communiqué released after
Pompeo’s June 17 meeting in Hawaii with Yang Jiechi, the director of the
Communist Party’s Office of Foreign Affairs, was vintage Cold War. On the
persecution of the Uighurs, for example, it called on "the US side to
respect China's counter-terrorism and de-radicalization efforts, stop applying
double standards on counter-terrorism issues, and stop using Xinjiang-related
issues as a pretext to interfere in China's internal affairs."
Pompeo’s June 17 meeting in Hawaii with Yang Jiechi, the director of the
Communist Party’s Office of Foreign Affairs, was vintage Cold War. On the
persecution of the Uighurs, for example, it called on "the US side to
respect China's counter-terrorism and de-radicalization efforts, stop applying
double standards on counter-terrorism issues, and stop using Xinjiang-related
issues as a pretext to interfere in China's internal affairs."
And this old shrillness, so reminiscent of the Mao Zedong
era, is not reserved for the U.S. alone. The Chinese government lashes out at
any country that has the temerity to criticize it, from Australia — "gum
stuck to the bottom of China's shoe" according to the editor of the
Party-controlled Global Times — to India to the U.K.
era, is not reserved for the U.S. alone. The Chinese government lashes out at
any country that has the temerity to criticize it, from Australia — "gum
stuck to the bottom of China's shoe" according to the editor of the
Party-controlled Global Times — to India to the U.K.
Those who hope to revive engagement, or at least establish
frenmity with Beijing, underestimate the influence of Wang Huning, a member since 2017 of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo, the most powerful body in China, and Xi’s most influential adviser.
Back in August 1988, Wang spent six months in the U.S. as a visiting scholar,
traveling to more than 30 cities and nearly 20 universities. His account of
that trip, "America against America," (published in 1991) is a
critique — in places scathing — of American democracy, capitalism and culture
(racial division features prominently in the third chapter).
frenmity with Beijing, underestimate the influence of Wang Huning, a member since 2017 of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo, the most powerful body in China, and Xi’s most influential adviser.
Back in August 1988, Wang spent six months in the U.S. as a visiting scholar,
traveling to more than 30 cities and nearly 20 universities. His account of
that trip, "America against America," (published in 1991) is a
critique — in places scathing — of American democracy, capitalism and culture
(racial division features prominently in the third chapter).
Yet the book that has done the most to educate me about how
China views America and the world today is, as I said, not a political text,
but a work of science fiction. "The
Dark Forest" was Liu Cixin’s 2008 sequel to the hugely successful
"Three-Body Problem." It would be hard to overstate Liu’s influence
in contemporary China: He is revered by the Shenzhen and Hangzhou tech
companies, and was officially endorsed as one of the faces of 21st-century
Chinese creativity by none other than … Wang Huning.
China views America and the world today is, as I said, not a political text,
but a work of science fiction. "The
Dark Forest" was Liu Cixin’s 2008 sequel to the hugely successful
"Three-Body Problem." It would be hard to overstate Liu’s influence
in contemporary China: He is revered by the Shenzhen and Hangzhou tech
companies, and was officially endorsed as one of the faces of 21st-century
Chinese creativity by none other than … Wang Huning.
"The
Dark Forest," which continues the story of the invasion of Earth by the
ruthless and technologically superior Trisolarans, introduces Liu’s three
axioms of “cosmic sociology.”
Dark Forest," which continues the story of the invasion of Earth by the
ruthless and technologically superior Trisolarans, introduces Liu’s three
axioms of “cosmic sociology.”
First, “Survival is the primary need of civilization.”
Second, “Civilization continuously grows and expands, but the total matter in
the universe remains constant.” Third, “chains of suspicion” and the risk of a
“technological explosion” in another civilization mean that in space there can only be the law of the jungle.
In the words of the book’s hero, Luo Ji:
Second, “Civilization continuously grows and expands, but the total matter in
the universe remains constant.” Third, “chains of suspicion” and the risk of a
“technological explosion” in another civilization mean that in space there can only be the law of the jungle.
In the words of the book’s hero, Luo Ji:
The
universe is a dark forest. Every civilization is an armed hunter stalking
through the trees like a ghost … trying to tread without sound … The hunter has
to be careful, because everywhere in the forest are stealthy hunters like him.
If he finds other life — another hunter, an angel or a demon, a delicate infant
or a tottering old man, a fairy or a demigod — there’s only one thing he can
do: open fire and eliminate them. In this forest, hell is other people … any
life that exposes its own existence will be swiftly wiped out.
universe is a dark forest. Every civilization is an armed hunter stalking
through the trees like a ghost … trying to tread without sound … The hunter has
to be careful, because everywhere in the forest are stealthy hunters like him.
If he finds other life — another hunter, an angel or a demon, a delicate infant
or a tottering old man, a fairy or a demigod — there’s only one thing he can
do: open fire and eliminate them. In this forest, hell is other people … any
life that exposes its own existence will be swiftly wiped out.
Kissinger is often thought of (in my view, wrongly) as the
supreme American exponent of Realpolitik. But this is something much harsher
than realism. This is intergalactic
Darwinism.
supreme American exponent of Realpolitik. But this is something much harsher
than realism. This is intergalactic
Darwinism.
Of course, you may say, it’s just sci-fi. Yes, but "The
Dark Forest" gives us an insight into something we think too little about:
how Xi’s China thinks. It’s not up to us whether or not we have a Cold War
with China, if China has already declared Cold War on us.
Dark Forest" gives us an insight into something we think too little about:
how Xi’s China thinks. It’s not up to us whether or not we have a Cold War
with China, if China has already declared Cold War on us.
Not only are we already in the foothills of that new Cold
War; those foothills are also impenetrably covered in a dark forest of China’s
devising.
War; those foothills are also impenetrably covered in a dark forest of China’s
devising.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the
editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To contact the author of this story:
Niall Ferguson at nferguson23@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net
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